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I. Introduction 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was passed with 
bipartisan support in 1990 with the stated purpose of protecting 
individuals from disability based discrimination.1 One of the specific 
goals of the ADA was to ensure economic self-sufficiency for disabled 
individuals, and Title I of the ADA prohibits employment 
discrimination against “qualified individuals with…disabilities.”2  
Despite the initial high hopes of disability rights activists, as a result 
of restrictive court decisions, the ADA was largely unsuccessful in 
prohibiting discrimination against individuals with disabilities.3   
On September 25, 2008, the Americans with Disabilities Act 
Amendments Act (ADAAA) was unanimously approved by both 
houses of Congress4 and signed into law by President George W. 
Bush.5 The ADAAA specifically overturned four Supreme Court 
decisions that had narrowly defined the term disability under the 
ADA. One of Congress’ main objectives in enacting the ADAAA was 
to turn the focus of ADA cases away from the definition of disability 
and instead refocus these cases on the issue of discrimination.6  The 
expanded definition of disability has led to this objective being met 
and courts in Title I cases are now more likely to grapple with the 
question of whether disabled employees are discriminated against in 
the workplace. 
 
1. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). See 
also Stephen F. Befort, An Empirical Examination of Case Outcomes 
Under the ADA Amendments Act, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2027, 2027 
(2013). 
2. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (“No 
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the 
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
trainings, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.”). 
Id. at § 12111 (2012) (stating that the ADA applies to private 
employers with 15 or more employees, employment agencies, labor 
organizations, and management committees). 
3. See Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., Restoring the ADA and Beyond:  Disability 
in the 21st Century, 13 TEX. J.C.L. & C.R. 241, 242 n. 2 (2008) (noting 
the significant amount of literature “devoted to defending, criticizing, 
and analyzing the [ADA]”); see also generally Ruth Colker, The 
Americans with Disabilities Act:  A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 110–16 (1999) (stating that contrary to popular 
belief the ADA has not created a windfall for plaintiffs). 
4. 154 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. H8298 
(daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008). 
5. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325, (122 Stat.) 3553 (2008). 
6. Befort, supra note 1, at 2029. 
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The ADA and the ADAAA apply to both physical and mental 
illness and an identical framework is used in analyzing claims of 
disability discrimination in the workplace regardless of whether the 
employee has a physical or mental disability.  However, there are a 
number of ways in which mental illness is generally different than 
physical illness, and there are a number of unique hurdles faced by 
mentally ill employees in ADA and ADAAA litigation.  These hurdles 
stem both from actual limitations associated with mental illness as 
well as from stereotypes and stigmas that society has about mentally 
ill individuals. 
This Article will examine how the ADAAA has impacted and will 
likely continue to impact employees with mental illness in the 
workplace. The Article will address both the ways in which the 
broadened definition of disability under the ADAAA has expanded 
protection for mentally ill employees in the workplace, as well as the 
hurdles that are still faced by employees who suffer from mental 
illness. While the expanded definition of disability under the ADAAA 
has removed one significant hurdle, the ADAAA failed to make other 
necessary statutory amendments and as a result, many mentally ill 
employees continue to have difficulty establishing a prima facie case 
of disability discrimination under the ADAAA.    
Part II of the Article will provide a brief background on the ADA 
and discuss the Supreme Court decisions that narrowly interpreted 
the ADA.  Part III of this Article will address the differences between 
mental illness and physical illness, highlighting some of the unique 
aspects of mental illness.  This Part will also discuss the various 
stereotypes and stigmas surrounding mental illness.  Part IV will 
examine the ways in which the ADAAA has expanded the definition 
of disability under the Act, and how the expanded definition has 
impacted mentally ill employees in the workplace.  Part V will then 
address the hurdles that mentally ill employees still face under the 
ADAAA.  The Article concludes that while the ADAAA’s expanded 
definition of disability has helped mentally ill employees in the 
workplace, many employees still face difficulty in establishing a prima 
facie case of disability discrimination and demonstrating that they 
suffered discrimination because of their disability.   
II. The ADA 
This Part provides a brief background on the history and terms of 
the original version of the ADA, which was passed by Congress in 
1990. It also discusses the Supreme Court cases that narrowly 
interpreted the ADA and were the impetus for Congress unanimously 
passing the ADAAA in 2008.  In doing so, this Part provides the 
background for why Congress enacted the ADAAA. 
A. Overview of the ADA 
The ADA was passed with bipartisan support in 1990, with the 
stated purpose of protecting individuals with disabilities from 
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disability based discrimination.7  One of the specific goals of the ADA 
was to ensure economic self-sufficiency for disabled individuals and 
Title I of the ADA prohibits employment discrimination against 
“qualified individuals with…disabilities.”8  Despite initial high hopes of 
disability rights activists, the ADA was largely unsuccessful in 
prohibiting disability based discrimination.9   
While the ADA is civil rights legislation that is aimed at 
protecting individuals with disabilities from discrimination in a 
manner similar to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,10 it also 
differs in two important ways from Title VII.11  First, Title VII 
prohibits discrimination “because of” certain protected categories.12  
In other words, it protects all people from discrimination based on 
protected categories such as “sex” or “race,” and plaintiffs do not 
need to prove that they have a “sex” or a “race.”  The ADA, on the 
other hand only protects individuals who meet the statutory 
definition of “disability” under the Act.   
Second, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in general only prohibits 
discrimination and does not affirmatively mandate accommodation.13  
The ADA, however, includes an affirmative requirement of 
accommodation and looks at whether an employee is qualified for the 
job either “with or without a reasonable accommodation.”14 Such 
accommodation is mandated under the ADA unless it would impose 
an “undue hardship” on the employer.15  The ADA therefore treats 
disability differently than most protected categories under Title VII, 
but similarly to how Title VII treats religion, since reasonable 
 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012). See also Befort, supra note 1; Lorraine 
Schmall, One Step Closer to Mental Health Parity, 9 NEV. L.J. 646, 649-
50 (2009).  
8. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2012) (“No 
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the 
basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
trainings, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment.”). 
9. See Colker, supra note 3, at 160. 
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012). 
11. Befort supra note 1, at 2033. 
12. Chai R. Feldblum, Kevin Berry & Emily A Benfer, The ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 187, 187 (2008). 
13. Befort, supra note 1, at 2033.  See also Matthew Diller, Judicial 
Backlash and the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 43 (2000). 
14. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §12111(8) (2012). 
15. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) 
(2012). 
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accommodation of religious employees is mandated by Title VII.16  
In order to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination 
under Title I of the ADA a plaintiff must show that he “(1) [is] a 
disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with or 
without a reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential 
functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by 
an employer or prospective employer because of that disability.”17 
Prior to the passage of the ADAAA, the largest hurdle faced by 
plaintiffs in ADA cases was demonstrating that they met the first 
prong of the prima facie case, which is satisfying the statutory 
definition of disability.  The ADA states that an individual is disabled 
if he has “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more major life activities…; (B) a record of such an 
impairment; or (C) [is] regarded as having such an impairment.”18  
Courts had interpreted the term “disabled” so narrowly that the 
majority of plaintiffs were unable to show that they met the statutory 
definition of “disabled.”19  In most pre-ADAAA cases, the issue was 
not whether the plaintiff suffered from an impairment, but rather 
whether the impairment substantially limited a major life activity.  In 
narrowly interpreting the ADA, lower courts found that plaintiffs who 
suffered from diseases including cancer, multiple dystrophy, epilepsy, 
and depression were not disabled.20 
B. Supreme Court Decisions Narrowly Interpreting the ADA 
Two Supreme Court cases in particular significantly narrowed the 
definition of disability and directly led to the eventual passage of the 
 
16. Section 701(j) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act requires employers to 
“reasonably accommodate” an employee’s religious beliefs and practices 
unless doing so would cause “undue hardship on the conduct of the 
employer’s business.”42 U.S.C. § 2000e (j) (2012). The United States 
Supreme Court has narrowly defined “undue hardship” as any cost 
greater than de minimis.  See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 
(1977) (the United States Supreme Court defined “undue hardship” as 
any cost greater than de minimis). However, despite this narrow 
interpretation there are lower courts that require a more meaningful 
level of accommodation. See generally Debbie N. Kaminer, Title VII’s 
Failure to Provide Meaningful and Consistent Protection of Religious 
Employees: Proposals for an Amendment, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. 
L. 575, 579 (2000). 
17. E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012). 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2012). 
19. See generally Befort, supra note 1, at 2037-39; Schmall, supra note 7, at 
650-51; James Concannon, Mind Matters: Mental Disability and the 
History and Future of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 LAW & 
PSYCHOL. REV. 89, 99-103 (2012). 
20. Schmall, supra note 7, at 650-51; Colker, supra note 3, at 110-16.   
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ADAAA.21  In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Court affirmed 
the judgment of the Tenth Circuit and held that when making a 
determination as to whether an individual is disabled under the ADA, 
the individual’s disability should be examined in its mitigated state.22   
The plaintiffs in Sutton were sisters who suffered from severe myopia, 
but had 20/20 vision with corrective lenses.23  They were denied 
positions as pilots at United Airlines since the company required 
pilots to have uncorrected vision of at least 20/100.24  The Sutton 
Court determined the plaintiffs were not “disabled” under the ADA, 
since their eyesight was normal in its mitigated state.25   
The Sutton Court also held that the plaintiffs were not “regarded 
as” disabled under the third prong of the ADA’s definition of 
disability since they were only unable to work in the specific job of 
airline pilot.26 According to the Court, a plaintiff would need to show 
that her employer perceived her impairment as substantially limiting 
a major life activity.  The plaintiffs in Sutton had argued that their 
employer regarded them as substantially limited in the major life 
activity of working.  However, the Court dismissed this argument 
since the employees were not perceived as unable to work in a broad 
class of jobs but rather only in the specific job of airline pilot.   
The Supreme Court further narrowed the definition of disabled in 
Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams.27 The plaintiff in this 
case was unable to do her assembly line job without an 
accommodation because she suffered from carpal tunnel syndrome.  
The Toyota Court narrowly defined both the terms “substantially 
limiting” and “major life activity,” determining that these terms 
“need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for 
qualifying as disabled.”28 The Court held that a “substantially 
limiting” impairment must “prevent or severely restrict”29 an 
individual from doing an activity that is of “central importance to 
most people’s daily lives.”30 A major life activity therefore was not 
 
21. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(3)-(4) (2012).  See also Befort, supra note 1, at 
2029. 
22. Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 US 471, 472 (1999). 
23. Id. at 475.  
24. Id. at 475-76. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 490-491. 
27. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002). 
28. Id. at 196-97. 
29. Id. at 198. 
30. Id. 
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what was important in a particular plaintiff’s life but rather what was 
important in “most people’s daily lives.”31  The Court determined that 
the plaintiff in Toyota was not disabled because, while she was unable 
to do the manual tasks necessary for an assembly line job, she was 
able to do manual tasks that were of “central importance”32 in most 
people’s daily lives. In the aftermath of Sutton and Toyota, the 
majority of plaintiffs were unable to meet the statutory definition of 
“disabled” under the ADA.  
Under the Sutton and Toyota decisions, plaintiffs were often put 
in a catch-22 situation where they were too disabled to qualify for or 
keep the jobs that they wanted, but they were not disabled enough to 
merit protection under the ADA. As a result, plaintiffs in employment 
discrimination cases filed under the ADA had dismal win rates. One 
study found that plaintiffs in Title I ADA employment discrimination 
cases lost 97% of the time.33  
Furthermore, as a result of the narrowing of the ADA’s protected 
class under Sutton and Toyota, plaintiffs became significantly less 
likely to file discrimination charges under the ADA.34   This is evident 
in an examination of both the EEOC’s charge filing statistics and the 
number of federal court cases that were filed in the aftermath of these 
Supreme Court decisions.35 Employees with impairments assumed that 
they would not be considered “disabled” under these restrictive 
decisions, and that it would therefore be futile to file a discrimination 
claim under the ADA.36 
As this Part has explained, the Supreme Court’s restrictive 
reading of the original ADA essentially negated Congressional intent 
and left employees who had faced disability based discrimination with 
little recourse.  It is against this backdrop that Congress enacted the 
ADAAA.  Before addressing the impact of the ADAAA on mentally 
ill employees in the workplace in Part IV, the next Part will address 
the differences between mental illness and physical illness and some of 
the unique hurdles faced by mentally ill employees. 




33. Amy L. Allbright, 2009 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title 
I—Survey Update, 34 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 339, 341 
(2010). See Colker, supra note 3, at 108; Sharona Hoffman, Settling the 
Matter: Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALAB. L. REV. 305, 308 
(2008). 
34. Befort, supra note 1, at 2037-38.   
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
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This Part will discuss the definition of mental illness, explain how 
this definition has changed over time, and describe how mental illness 
and physical illness differ.  This Part will then address some of the 
reasons why mentally ill employees are less likely than physically ill 
employees to request accommodation in the workplace.  Finally, this 
Part will discuss the most prevalent stereotypes and stigmas involving 
mental illness.   
A.  Issues with the Definition and Diagnosis of Mental Illness 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC), mental illness is defined as “collectively all diagnosable 
mental disorders” or “health conditions that are characterized by 
alterations in thinking, mood, or behavior (or some combination 
thereof) associated with distress and/or impaired functioning.”37  As 
one commentator explained, mental disorders always involve “some 
disturbance of mental functioning, be it intellectual capacities, 
thought processes, emotions, or underlying motivations.”38 
The primary reference for mental health disorders, which is relied 
on by mental health practitioners, courts and government agencies is 
the American Psychiatric Association’s (APA) Diagnostic and 
Statistic Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM).39 The DSM was first 
published in 1952 and has been updated four times over the previous 
six decades.  The most recent version is DSM-5, which was released at 
the APA Annual Meeting in May 2013.40 The DSM is often viewed as 
the “bible” of mental illness and carries the stamp of objective 
medical expertise.  For example, some state statutes specifically 
reference DSM’s definition of mental disorder.41  However, as one 
commentator has explained, the DSM should not be viewed as a 
psychiatric “bible” but is rather “simply a consensus-built medical 
text with the attendant limits.”42   
 
37. Mental Health Basics, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
http://www.cdc.gov/mentalhealth/basics.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 
2015). 
38. Jane Byeff Korn, Crazy (Mental Illness Under the ADA), 36 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 585, 594 (2003). 
39. Douglas A. Hass, Could the American Psychiatric Association Cause 
you Headaches? The Dangerous Interaction Between the DSM-5 and 
Employment Law, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 683, 683 (2013). 
40. DSM-5 Overview, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, 
http://www.dsm5.org/about/Pages/DSMVOverview.aspx (last visited 
Jan. 27, 2015). 
41. Connecticut’s statutes state that mental disorders are defined as what is 
in “the most recent edition of the American Psychiatric Association’s 
‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.’” CONN. GEN. 
STAT. § 38a-488a. 
42. Hass, supra note 39, at 689.   
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Mental illness generally differs from physical illness in a number 
of ways that are important when addressing disability accommodation 
in the workplace under the ADAAA.  The definition of mental illness 
is somewhat illusive and continually in flux.43  Every version of the 
DSM includes different disorders, and what constitutes a mental 
disorder has evolved over time and is susceptible to cultural and 
societal norms.44  For example, homosexuality was considered a 
mental disorder until pressure within the APA led to its removal from 
the DSM in 1980. In pointing out the fluidity of the definition of 
mental illness, one commentator stated, “Wouldn[‘]t [sic] it be nice if 
we could rally and lobby and get the medical profession to take a vote 
and eliminate cancer as a deadly disease.”45  Currently, there is a 
gendered pattern to mental illness and woman are significantly more 
likely to be diagnosed with common mental disorders including 
depression and anxiety.46 Additionally, psychiatrists and psychologists 
may diagnose the same patient differently based on the particular 
clinician’s views and background.   
The general trend has been an increase in the number of 
diagnosable mental disorders in each successive version of the DSM.47  
DSM IV lists 297 mental disorders which is an increase of 
approximately 300% over the number of disorders listed in DSM-I 
which was published 42 years earlier.48 The current version of the 
DSM, DSM-5, has been criticized for being both expansive and 
continuing the move “towards a spectrum model of mental illness.”49  
In other words, DSM-5 captures subthreshold (e.g., mild depression, 
mild cognitive disorder) versions of existing disorders.50   
The diagnosis of mental illness also tends to be significantly more 
subjective than the diagnosis of physical illness.51  Many common 
 
43. See generally Deirdre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental 
Illness, Employment Discrimination, and The Americans With 
Disabilities Act, GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 79, 98-100 (2006). 
44. See id. at 90.  See also generally Hass, supra note 39. This has led one 
historian of mental illness to conclude “It is not only cynics who claim 
that polito-cultural, racial, and gender prejudices still shape the 
diagnosis of what are purportedly objective disease syndromes.” ROY 
PORTER, MADNESS:  A BRIEF HISTORY 214 (2002). 
45. Korn, supra note 38, at 624. 
46. See id. at 596. 
47. See id. at 624. 
48. Hass, supra note 39, at 690. 
49. Id. at 712-13. 
50. Id. at 713. 
51. Michelle Parikh, Burning the Candle at Both Ends, and there is Nothing 
Left for Proof: The Americans with Disabilities Act’s Disservice to 
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physical illnesses are diagnosed in an objective manner through the 
use of bloods tests, MRIs, x-rays, and electrocardiograms. There are a 
smaller number of physical illnesses that are diagnosed based on self-
reporting of symptoms, such as chronic migraines52 and fibromagylia.53  
Mental illness, on the other hand, is diagnosed primarily based on the 
self-reporting of symptoms and to a lesser extent on observations of a 
patient.  There are also studies that indicate that in some cases 
mental illness can be objectively proven. 54   Additionally, mental 
health professionals can often determine when an individual is faking 
symptoms of mental illness.55  However, in general, objective proof is 
more readily available in cases of physical illness than in cases of 
mental illness.  Additionally, mental illness is often invisible.  For 
example, a mentally ill individual will not have a seeing eye dog, use a 
wheel chair, or be missing a limb — and people tend to be skeptical of 
things that they cannot see.56 These distinction have led skeptics to 
doubt that mental illness is real.57  
Another factor that often distinguishes mental and physical illness 
is that mental illness tends to be episodic.58  Various types of mental 
disorders, such as bipolar disorder and forms of depression may be 
chronic with acute episodes followed by a return to a normal level of 
 
Persons with Mental Illness, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 721, 748-51 (2004). 
See generally Korn, supra note 38, at 622-27 (discussing the biological 
basis of mental illness). 
52. See, e.g., P.J. Goadsby, Migraine: Diagnosis and Management, 33 
INTERNAL MED. J. 436 (2003). 
53. See, e.g., Robert S. Katz et al., Fibromyalgia Diagnosis: A Comparison 
of Clinical, Survey and American College of Rheumatology Criteria, 54 
ARTHRITIS & RHEUMATISM 169 (2006). 
54. See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., Brain Abnormalities Observed in 
Childhood-Onset Schizophrenia: A Review of the Structural Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging Literature, 6 MENTAL RETARDATION & 
DEVELOPMENT DISABILITIES RES. REV. 180 (2000). 
55. Douglas Starr, Can You Fake Mental Illness? How Forensic 
Psychologists Can Tell Whether Someone is Malingering, SLATE  
(Aug. 7,2012), http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/ 
science/2012/08/faking_insanity_forensic_psychologists_detect_signs_
of_malingering_.html. 
56. Korn, supra note 38, at 605-06. 
57. See infra Part III.C. 
58. Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric 
Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 281–82 (2000).  There are also 
some physical disabilities that are episodic such as lupus, multiple 
sclerosis and epilepsy. Id. at 282. 
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functioning.59  Since mental illness is episodic, recovery in mental 
illness often does not mean that the individual is cured.  The chronic 
and episodic nature of mental illness makes it difficult to even define 
what constitutes recovery from a serious mental illness.60   
B. Issues Affecting Requests for Accommodation 
Mentally ill employees are often less likely than physically ill 
employees to ask for accommodation in the workplace.  This may 
leave a mentally ill employee unprotected, since employers are only 
liable for discrimination under the ADA once they are made aware of 
the employee’s disability and need for accommodation.61  One reason 
that mentally ill employees do not ask for workplace accommodation 
is that they may simply not realize that they are ill.  If an employee is 
in a manic, delusional or psychotic state, he may not recognize that 
he is suffering from an illness and needs to request protection under 
the ADA.62 
The second reason that mentally ill employees do not ask for 
accommodation under the ADA is because they are actively hiding 
their disorder as a result of the stigma associated with mental illness.  
Employees who are aware that they are suffering from a mental 
disorder are often wary of letting their employer know they are ill 
because that disclosure could negatively impact their careers and 
potentially get them fired.  Employees with psychiatric disabilities 
often correctly assume that they will get greater protection by hiding 
their disability than from the ADA.   
C. Stereotypes and Stigmas Involving Mental Illness 
Individuals who suffer from both physical and mental disabilities 
have historically been stigmatized and subjected to discrimination.63   
59. See Breanne M. Sheetz, The Choice to Limit Choice: Using Psychiatric 
Advance Directives to Manage the Effects of Mental Illness and Support 
Self-Responsibility, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 401, 404 (2007). 
60. Larry Davidson et al., Recovery in Serious Mental Illness:  A New Wine 
or Just a New Bottle? 36 PROF. PSYCHOL. RES. & PRAC. 480 (2005) 
(discussing the lack of consensus as to what constitutes recovery in 
mental illness and the various definitions of recovery); Larry Davidson 
and David Roe, Recovery from Versus Recovery in Serious Mental 
Illness: One Strategy for Lessening Confusion Plaguing Recovery, 16 J. 
MENTAL HEALTH 459, 460 (2007) (discussing the various meanings of 
recovery in mental illness). 
61. Stefan, supra note 58, at 289-90. 
62. Id. at 401-03. 
63. Patrick W. Corrigan & David L. Penn, Lessons from Social Psychology 
on Discrediting Psychiatric Stigma, 54 AM. PSYCHOL. 765 (1999). See 
also Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Todd Jones, Bridging the Physical-
Mental Gap: An Empirical Look at the Impact of Mental Illness Stigma 
on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 50-51 (2005); Stefan, supra 
note 58, at 273-74; Korn, supra note 38, at 605-09. 
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However, the stigma associated with mental illness is both greater and 
more pervasive than the stigma associated with physical illness.64  The 
public is less likely to rent a house to a mentally ill individual and less 
likely to socialize with someone suffering from mental illness.65  
Employers are often reluctant to hire individuals with mental illness, 
which leads to both unemployment and underemployment. 66  Studies 
have also shown that it is specifically the stigma of mental illness—
and not only the functional limitations associated with mental 
illness—that have led to lower mean wages for those who suffer from 
mental illness in comparison to those who do not.67 This subpart will 
look at some of the negative stereotypes associated with mental 
illness.  
1. Not a Real Disease; Just a Character Defect 
One of the most prevalent stereotypes is that mental illness is not 
a real disease.68  This stereotype stems from the fact that mental 
illness is often invisible and cannot be objectively proven.69  Cynics 
and skeptics may therefore doubt it is real.  It is interesting to note 
that individuals who suffer from a physical disability along with a 
mental disability do better in the workforce than individuals suffering 
only from mental illness.70  In other words, having a “real” physical 
illness makes the accompanying mental illness more believable.  For 
example, if someone has cancer, it would make sense that the 
individual might also suffer from depression and anxiety.71 
This skepticism and doubt that mental illness is “real” tends to 
 
64. Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 51.  See also Bethany A. Teachman 
et al., Implicit and Explicit Stigma of Mental Illness in Diagnosed and 
Healthy Samples, 25 J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 75, 76 (2006) 
(discussing differing attitudes towards mental illness and physical 
illness). 
65. Patrick W. Corrigan et al., Challenging Two Mental Illness Stigmas: 
Personal Responsibility and Dangerousness, 28 SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL. 
293, 293-95 (2002). 
66. See Cressida Manning & Peter D. White, Attitudes of Employers to the 
Mentally Ill, 19 PSYCHIATRIC BULL. 541 (1995). 
67. See Marjorie L. Baldwin & Steven C. Marcus, Perceived and Measured 
Stigma Among Workers with Serious Mental Illness, 57 PSYCHIATRIC 
SERVICES 388, 391 (2006). 
68. Terry Krupa et al., Understanding the Stigma of Mental Illness in 
Employment, 33 WORK 413, 419 (2009). 
69. See supra Part III.A. 
70. Edward H. Yelin & Miriam G. Cisternas, Employment Patterns among 
People with and without Mental Conditions, in MENTAL DISORDER, 
WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAW 25, 35 (Richard J. Bonnie & John 
Monahan eds., 1997). 
71. Korn, supra note 38, at 607-08. 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:   
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection? 
217 
lead to one of two conclusions.  First, some believe that mental illness 
is nothing more than a character defect or a personality flaw. Second, 
others believe that individuals claiming to be “mentally ill” are just 
malingerers looking to take advantage of their employer.  
Historically, mental illness has been associated with undesirable 
personality characteristics and personal shortcomings. Mentally ill 
individuals are often viewed as weak, unstable and unable to deal 
with the stress of everyday life.72 According to this line of reasoning, 
individuals who claim to be mentally ill simply need to “buck up” and 
behave in a more appropriate and desirable manner.  Proponents of 
this view believe that everyone has to deal with difficult situations 
and occasionally feels anxious or sad, and individuals who claim to be 
mentally ill simply need to try harder.    
This stereotype of mental illness as a character flaw was evident 
in comments made by senators during the Congressional debates 
regarding passage of the ADA. For example, Sen. William L. 
Armstrong (R-CO) stated that he thought that the purpose of the 
legislation was to protect the handicapped and people in wheelchairs 
and he could not imagine giving “protected status” to disabilities that 
“might have a moral content to them.”73  Sen. Jesse Helms (R-GA) 
was concerned about the impact on an employer’s ability to maintain 
moral standards if coverage extended to employees who were manic 
depressives and schizophrenics.74  Even one of the co-sponsors of the 
ADA, Sen. Warren Rudman (R-NH), expressed concern with 
including mental illness since it “is frequently made on the basis of a 
pattern of socially unacceptable behavior and lacks any physiological 
basis…[W]e are talking about behavior that is immoral, improper or 
illegal and which individuals are engaging in of their own volition.”75   
It is noteworthy that mental illness was the only type of disability 
that was specifically attacked during the Congressional debates on the 
ADA.76 
The idea that mental illness is not a real disease has also lead to 
the conclusion that mentally ill individuals are malingerers who are 
actively faking symptoms to deceive others and get some type of 
 
72. See id. at 605-06.  
73. 135 CONG. REC. S10753 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. 
Armstrong). 
74. 135 CONG. REC. S10765 (daily ed. Sep. 7, 1989) (statement of Sen. 
Helms). 
75. Id. at S10796 (statement of Sen. Rudman). 
76. SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL RIGHTS: DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE 
WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 
6 (Allison Risko & Amy J. Clarke eds. 2001). 
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preferential treatment. 77  This stereotype is evident in the popular 
press, scholarly literature, and court opinions.78 It encompasses 
individuals who may either be fully faking their “illness” as well as 
those who are exaggerating their illness for personal benefit.  This 
concern that individuals could fake mental disorders has been raised 
in a different context at the United States Supreme Court.79   
Perhaps nobody embodies this stereotype better than Vincent 
Gigante—one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the United States 
who did fake his mental illness for decades in an effort to hide his 
Mafia position and avoid prison time.80  He was often seen wandering 
around Greenwich Village in New York City in his bathrobe and 
slippers mumbling to himself. After his conviction, a prison 
psychologist grudgingly complimented the “sophistication of his 
malingering attempt.”81 Unfortunately for individuals who really do 
suffer from mental illness, the stereotype of the mentally ill as 
malingerers remains prevalent in society.82    
2. The Stereotype of the Mentally Ill as Violent 
Another stereotype involving mental illness is that mentally ill 
individuals are more dangerous and violent than the general 
population, and that mental illness is actually a specific type of 
character flaw.83 This view of the mentally ill as violent has been 
perpetuated by the media and is seen in both movies and television 
programs where mentally ill individuals are often portrayed as 
psychotic killers and evil people.84  Additionally, when horrific crimes 
are committed, the media often focuses on the role played by mental 
 
77. Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 55-56. 
78. Id. 
79. In a death penalty case involving an intellectually disabled/mentally 
retarded defendant, Justice Scalia expressed concern that “the 
symptoms of this condition can readily be feigned.” Atkins v. Virginia, 
536 U.S. 304, 353 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
80. Selwyn Raab, Vincent Gigante, Mob Boss Who Feigned Incompetence 
to Avoid Jail, Dies at 77, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/20/obituaries/vincent-gigante-mob-
boss-who-feigned-incompetence-to-avoid-jail-dies-at-77.html. 
81. Larry McShane, Vincent Gigante (Vinny the Chin) Never Abandoned 
Demented Alter Ego In Prison, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 3, 2007), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/crime/vincent-gigante-vinny-chin-
abandoned-demented-alter-ego-prison-article-1.271384. 
82. See Starr, supra note 55 (Gigante only admitted his ruse in exchange for 
a plea deal). 
83. See Ann Hubbard, The ADA, The Workplace and the Myth of the 
Dangerous Mentally Ill, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 849, 850–51 (2001). 
84. Korn, supra note 38, at 608. 
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illness in the commission of the crime, further perpetuating the 
stereotype that mental illness makes people violent. One recent 
example is focus on the perpetrator’s mental illness in coverage of the 
2012 school shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in 
Newton, Connecticut, where 20 children and 6 adult staff members 
were killed by a gunman.85 The view that mentally ill individuals are 
violent and dangerous has become embedded in American culture.86 
While the research is somewhat mixed as to whether mentally ill 
individuals are more violent than the general population, any 
correlation that exists is both small and overly exaggerated in the 
public’s mind.  Some studies have found that mentally ill individuals 
are not more likely to be violent.87  Other studies have found that 
while there is a small correlation between violence and mental illness, 
this correlation is primarily caused by other comorbid factors.88  The 
author of one meta-analysis explained that “mental disorders are 
neither necessary nor sufficient causes of violence.”89 The major 
determinants of propensity toward violence are being young, male and 
from a lower socio-economic status.90  Other determinants of violence 
include marital status and education.91  Substance abuse is also a 
significant determinant of violence, and a meta-analysis found that 
most of the excess risk of violence in individuals with psychosis is 
caused by substance abuse and not the psychosis.92   Mentally ill 
individuals are far more likely to be the victim of violence than they 
are to engage in violent behavior.93   
The stereotype of mentally ill individuals as dangerous is 
 
85. Sydney Lupkin, Newton Shooting Put Spotlight on U.S. Mental Health 
Care – Again, ABCNEWS.COM, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ 
newtown-shootings-put-spotlight-mental-health-care/story?id=18001556 
(last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
86. Korn, supra note 38, at 608. 
87. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions: Data from the 
MacArthur Violence Risk Assessment Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 
566, 566–72 (2000) (finding that delusions were not associated with a 
higher risk of violent behavior). 
88. Heather Stuart, Violence and Mental Illness: An Overview, 2 WORLD 
PSYCHIATRY 121, 123 (2003); Fazel Seena et. al., Schizophrenics and 
Violence: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 6 PLoS 1, 5 (2009). 
89. Stuart, supra note 88, at 123.   
90. Id. 
91. Korn, supra note 38, at 613. 
92. Seena et al., supra note 88, at 7 (explaining that substance abusers 
without psychosis are just as likely to be violent as substance abusers 
who do suffer from psychosis). 
93. Stuart, supra note 88, at 123.  
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responsible for a significant portion of employment discrimination 
against the mentally ill.94 Employers, concerned with both violence in 
the workplace generally as well as their potential liability for hiring 
violent individuals, are often reluctant to hire mentally ill 
individuals.95  Unfortunately, it is often very difficult to predict 
violent behavior, regardless of whether or not an individual suffers 
from mental illness.96 While the public may assume that workplace 
violence is preventable and predictable, most experts disagree, and 
even trained psychiatrists have difficulty accurately predicting 
workplace violence. 97 While it is not possible to entirely eliminate the 
risk of workplace violence, employers can still take reasonable steps to 
minimize the risk, such as reviewing their hiring process, conducting 
thorough background checks, and keeping their security measures and 
disciplinary policies up to date.98 Unfortunately, though, the inability 
to accurately predict violent behavior along with the stereotype that 
mentally ill individuals are violent continues to lead to discrimination 
against the mentally ill.  
3. The Stereotype of the Mentally Ill as Incompetent 
Another stereotype is that mentally ill individuals are 
incompetent and have difficulty functioning as capable adults.99  
While some individuals with psychiatric disorders may in fact be 
found to be legally incompetent or “mentally incapacitated,” many 
mentally ill individuals are not.  Since mental illness is often episodic, 
individuals may go through periods when they are incompetent 
followed by long periods of high functioning.  However, the stereotype 
persists and results in the paternalistic view that mentally ill 
individuals generally need others to care for them.  This concern was 
raised during the Congressional debates on the ADA.100 This 
stereotype is particularly harmful to mentally ill individuals in the 
 
94. John Monahan et. al., Developing a Clinically Useful Actuarial Tool for 
Assessing Violence Risk, 176 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 312 (2000) 
(discussing the effect of stereotypes on the mentally ill). 
95. Korn, supra note 38, at 613-14. 
96. Id. at 614. 
97. See Richard A. Friedman, Why Can’t Doctors Identify Killers?, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 27, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/28/opinion/ 
why-cant-doctors-identify-killers.html?_r=0; David Brown, Predicting 




98. Korn, supra note 38, at 614-15. 
99. Krupa et al., supra note 68, at 418-19; Hensel & Jones, supra note 63.   
100. Concannon, supra note 19, at 82.   
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workplace, since few employers would want to hire an incompetent 
employee.  Employees who suffer from mental illness are also less 
likely to have opportunities for training and promotion since their 
employers tend to focus on their deficits rather than their strengths.101 
As this Part explained, there are some important ways in which 
mental illness and physical illness differ, and there are numerous 
stereotypes and stigmas associated with mental illness.  Additionally, 
mentally ill employees may be less likely than physically ill employees 
to request workplace accommodation.  The next Part will focus on 
how the ADAAA impacts mentally ill employees in the workplace.   
IV. The Impact of the ADAAA’s Expanded Definition 
of “Disability” on Mentally Ill Employees  
This Part discusses the impact that the ADAAA has had on 
mentally ill employees in the workplace.  It specifically addresses how 
the ADAAA overturned the Supreme Court’s restrictive decisions and 
broadened the definition of disability.  In doing so, this Part explores 
the impact that the expanded definition of disability has had on 
mentally ill employees and the ways in which it has increased 
protection for these employees.  The focus of this Part will be on 
federal court decisions.      
A.  Generally Broadening the Term “Disability”   
The purpose of the ADAAA was to broaden the term disability 
and overrule the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton and Toyota, and 
not surprisingly, under the ADAAA courts have interpreted 
“disability” in a significantly more expansive manner than they did in 
the pre-ADAAA cases.102  
Despite its expressly stated purpose of expanding the 
interpretation of “disability,” the ADAAA did not actually change the 
language defining “disabled” from what was included in the original 
language of the ADA.103  As a result of political compromise aimed at 
increasing the likelihood of passage of the ADAAA, the definition of 
disabled remained identical to the definition that the Toyota Court 
had narrowly interpreted.104  Instead, the ADAAA made smaller 
 
101. Krupa et al., supra note 68, at 419. 
102. Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 
110-325 § 2(b)(2)-(5), (122 Stat.) 3553, 3554 (2008). See also generally 
Kevin M. Barry, Exactly What Congress Intended? 17 EMP. RTS. & 
EMP. POL’Y J. 5, 19-20 (2013) (discussing the broadened definition of 
disability under the ADAAA). 
103. Kate Webber, Correcting the Supreme Court—Will it Listen? Using the 
Models of Judicial Decision-Making to Predict the Future of the ADA 
Amendments Act, 23 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 305, 320-21 (2014). 
104. Id. For a general discussion of the history of passage of the ADAAA, see 
Barry, supra note 102; Kevin Barry, Toward Universalism: What the 
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changes to the ADA including instructional amendments which 
provide direction on how courts should interpret the ADAAA.105 The 
Statement of Purpose of the ADAAA states that “the primary object 
of attention in cases brought under the ADAAA should be whether 
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations 
and…the question of whether an individual’s impairment is a disability 
under the ADAAA should not demand extensive analysis.”106 The new 
Rules of Construction of the ADAAA also require a more expansive 
interpretation of the term disability stating that “the definition of 
disability in this Act shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals under the Act.”107  In addition to generally broadening the 
term disability, the ADAAA also specifically expands the term 
disability in a manner that is applicable to mental illness which will 
be discussed in the following four Subparts.108 
Cases interpreting the term disability under the ADAAA have 
begun to work their way through the courts.  While the ADAAA was 
passed in 2008 and became effective on January 1, 2009, it does not 
apply retroactively to cases that were pending prior to its effective 
date.109  In post-ADAAA decisions, courts are granting significantly 
fewer summary judgment rulings to employers based on disability 
status alone.110  This is an important change, since in the  aftermath 
of the Sutton decision and prior to the enactment of the ADAAA, 
plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases filed under the ADA 
had dismal win rates, with many courts granting summary judgment 
for the employer based on a determination that the plaintiff did not 
meet the statutory definition of disabled.111  Furthermore, as a result 
of the narrowing of the ADA’s protected class under Sutton and 
Toyota, plaintiffs were unlikely to even file discrimination charges 
since they assumed that they would lose based on disability status 
 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 Can and Can’t do for Disability Rights, 
31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 203, 278 (2010). 
105. Webber, supra note 103, at 321-22.   
106. ADAAA § 2(b)(5), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008).  
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012). 
108. Befort, supra note 1, at 2043-44. 
109. Id. at 2031. 
110. Id. at 2031-32. See also ROBERT L. BURGDORF JR., NATIONAL COUNCIL 
ON DISABILITY, A PROMISING START: PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS OF COURT 
DECISIONS UNDER THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT 8 (2013). But see 
Webber, supra note 103, at 347-49.   
111. Befort, supra note 1, at 2038; Colker, supra note 3, at 107-16; Schmall, 
supra note 7, at 652-53; Hoffman, supra note 33, at 308-11.    
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alone.112    
While the generally expanded definition of disabled is a positive 
development for both physically and mentally disabled employees, it 
appears to be more helpful to physically disabled employees.  As 
explained in Part II, a plaintiff must both be “disabled” and also be 
“qualified” to establish class membership under Title I of the ADA.  
One 2005 study of three circuit courts found that physically and 
mentally impaired plaintiffs had similar levels of difficulty establishing 
class membership under the ADA.113   However, there were important 
differences in why plaintiffs failed to establish class membership.  
Approximately two-thirds of plaintiffs suffering from a physical illness 
were found to lack protected class status under the ADA because they 
were not “disabled” within the meaning of the statute.  On the other 
hand, two-thirds of mentally ill employees were found to lack 
protected class status because they were “unqualified” under the 
terms of the ADA.114  
Therefore, while both physically and mentally ill employees were 
often unable to establish class membership post-Sutton and pre-
ADAAA, the biggest hurdle faced by physically ill employees was the 
definition of disabled and the biggest hurdle faced by mentally ill 
employees was the definition of qualified.  While the ADAAA expands 
the definition of “disability,” no significant changes were made to the 
definition of “qualified.”115  As a result, while the expanded definition 
of disability has already and likely will continue to increase class 
membership for both physically and mentally disabled employees, the 
increase will be more pronounced for employees with physical 
disabilities.116  
Another recent study looked at federal court decisions between 
January 2010 and April 2013 and compared cases that were decided 
under the pre-amendment standards with those decided under the 
post-amendment standard.117  Like the 2005 study, this study—which 
 
112. Befort, supra note 1, at 2037-38.   
113. Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 65-69 (indicating that while plaintiffs 
with mental disabilities were slightly less likely to establish class 
membership than plaintiffs with physical disabilities, the difference was 
not statistically significant).  
114. Id. 
115. American with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1990) 
(amended 2008). 
116. Concannon, supra note 19, at 113. 
117. See generally Befort, supra note 1.  Since the ADAAA does not apply 
retroactively to cases that were pending prior to the date it went into 
effect courts were deciding cases under both the pre-ADAAA and post-
ADAAA standards during this time period.  Id. at 2031. 
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analyzed a different set of cases—also found that the narrow pre-
ADAAA definition of disability was a bigger hurdle for physically 
disabled individuals than for mentally disabled individuals.   
Summary judgment was granted to the employer in 78.3% of pre-
amendment cases involving a physical disability but only 60% of the 
pre-amendment cases involving a mental disability based on 
“disability status.”118  While post-amendment, the likelihood of 
surviving summary judgment increased for both physically and 
mentally ill employees in cases involving “disability status,” the 
increase was much greater for employees who suffered from a physical 
disability.119  Post amendment summary judgment was granted to the 
employer in 20.7% of cases involving physical illness and 40% of cases 
involving mental illness.120   In other words, the summary judgment 
win rate for employers based on disability status dropped from 78.3% 
to 20.7% in cases involving a physical disability and dropped from 
60% to 40% in cases involving a mental disability.121  
It appears that the expanded definition of disability has helped 
both physically and mentally disabled employees, but the impact has 
been greater on employees with a physical disability. The following 
four Subparts will discuss some of the specific ways in which the 
expanded definition of disability applies to mentally ill employees in 
the workplace. 
B. Mitigating Measures  
As explained in the previous subpart, the ADAAA does not 
change the statutory language defining disabled, but rather explains 
that the purpose of the Act is to expand how the definition of 
disability is interpreted.  In doing so, the Act explicitly rejects the 
Sutton Court’s holding that an employee’s disability should be 
considered in its mitigated state. Rather, under the ADAAA “the 
determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major 
life activity shall be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of 
mitigating measures.”122  The ADAAA does recognize as an exception 
that the “ameliorative effects of the mitigating measures of ordinary 
eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in determining 
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity.”123  
The 2011 EEOC Regulations paraphrase the ADAAA’s language on 
 
118. Id. at 2053.   
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 2054. 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i). 
123. Id. at § 12102(4)(E)(ii). 
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mitigating measures.124  
The amendment to the ADAAA regarding mitigating measures 
has been consistently applied by the courts and has expanded the 
definition of disability for both physically and mentally disabled 
employees.125  One report explained that this is not surprising since 
the change to the statutory language regarding mitigating factors is 
“unequivocal and not particularly complicated, and in fact, 
represented a return to a widely accepted analytical premise abruptly 
discarded by the Supreme Court.”126  Another scholar explained that a 
“court would be hard-pressed…to consider mitigating measures in 
contravention of such direct language.”127  
Since medication and therapy are commonly used to control 
mental illness and both medication and therapy are also explicitly 
listed by the ADAAA as a mitigating measure,128 this provision of the 
ADAAA will increase the number of mentally ill employees who have 
standing under the Act.   In pre-ADAAA cases, mentally ill 
employees who were able to control diseases such as bipolar 
disorder,129 schizophrenia130 and depression through the use of 
mitigating measures would not have met the statutory definition of 
disability. Post-ADAAA, these individuals will have their mental 
impairment considered in its unmitigated state.   
The amendment regarding mitigating measures will likely have a 
noticeable impact with regard to clinically depressed employees 
because depression is both a common disorder, and a disorder that 
 
124. 20 C.F.R § 1630.2(j)(1)(vi) (2012). 
125. See, e.g., Orne v. Christie, No. 3:12-CV-00290-JAG, 2013 WL 85171, at 
*3 (E.D. Va. Jan. 7, 2013) (finding plaintiff with sleep apnea was 
disabled despite mitigating measures); Harty v. City of Sanford, 2012 
WL3243282 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2012) (denying summary judgment for 
employer after determining that an employee’s disability should be 
examined in unmitigated state); O’Donnell v. Colonial Intermediate 
Unit 20, 2013 WL 1234813 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2013) (determining that 
impairments should be examined in unmitigated state in case involving 
several mental health conditions, but ultimately dismissing the 
plaintiff’s claim on other grounds). 
126. Burgdorf, supra note 110, at 65. 
127. Webber, supra note 103, at 344. 
128. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)(I)-(IV). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(5)(v) 
(2012) (listing “psychotherapy” and “behavioral therapy” as mitigating 
measures). 
129. Barry, supra note 102, at 227-28; Alex B. Long, Introducing the New 
and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act: Assessing the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 220 
(2008). 
130. Concannon, supra note 19, at 111. 
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can be helped with mitigating measures.  Clinical depression is one of 
the most prevalent diseases in the United States and antidepressants 
are one of the most commonly prescribed medications for working age 
Americans.131 According to the Center for Disease Control and 
Prevention (CDC), approximately 1 in 10 Americans suffer from 
depression and the age group most likely to suffer are 45-64 year 
olds.132 Antidepressants are the most commonly used medication for 
all individuals in the United States aged 18-44.133  Certain groups 
have particularly high rates of use of antidepressants. 15.9% of people 
aged 40-59 in the United States take antidepressants and 23% of 
women aged 40-59 take anti-depressants.134  While the majority of 
individuals take antidepressants to treat depression, they are also 
used to treat other diseases such as anxiety disorders.135 
Like other mental disorders, prior to ADAAA, if an employee’s 
depression was successfully treated with antidepressants, she would 
not meet the statutory definition of disability under the ADA.136  This 
meant that she was not entitled to any protection under the Act, and 
could be terminated because of her mental illness.  In post-ADAAA 
cases involving depression, courts must examine the employee’s 
disability in its unmitigated state and plaintiffs are more likely to 
meet the statutory definition of disabled.137  However, the employee is 
 
131. Elisa Y. Lee, An American Way of Life: Prescription Drug Use in the 
Modern ADA Workplace, 45 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 303, 309 
(2011). 
132. An Estimated 1 in 10 U.S. Adults Report Depression, CENTER FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/features/ 
dsdepression (last visited Jan. 27, 2015). 
133. Laura A. Pratt et al., Antidepressant Use in Persons Aged 12 and Over: 




136. See Befort, supra note 1, at 2039; Parikh, supra note 51, at 740 
(explaining that mitigating measures would include psychotropic 
medications).  See also, e.g., Allen v. Bellwouth Telecommunications 
Inc., F. App’x 197, 200 (6th Cir. 2012); Spades v. City of Walnut Ridge, 
186 F.3d 897, 900 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding plaintiff was not disabled 
within meaning of the ADA because his depression was treated with 
medication and counseling); McMullin v. Ashcroft, 337 F. Supp. 2d 
1281, 1288-9 (D. Wyo. 2004) (determining plaintiff whose clinical 
depression was treated with medication was not disabled under the 
ADA). 
137. See, e.g., Bracken v. DASKO Home Med. Equip., Inc., No. 1:12–CV–
892, 2014 WL 4388261, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2014) (holding that 
the ameliorative effect of medication on employee with depression 
should not be considered). 
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still required to demonstrate that the impairment in its unmitigated 
state meets the statutory definition of disability.138 
C. Episodic Disorders 
The ADAAA specifically extends the protection of the ADA to 
individuals with disabilities that are episodic in nature, stating that 
an “impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it 
would substantially limit a major life activity when active.”139  The 
2011 EEOC regulations both paraphrase the ADAAA and provide 
additional guidance regarding this expanded definition.140  While prior 
to passage of the ADAAA some courts had determined that 
impairments that were episodic would meet the statutory definition of 
disability,141 many held that episodic illnesses were not disabilities.142  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton seemed to support the more 
restrictive reading with the Court stating that an individual must be 
“presently – not potentially or hypothetically – substantially limited 
in order to demonstrate a disability.”143 This provision of the ADAAA 
has expanded the definition of disability in cases involving both 
physical and mental ill employees.144 
Extending the protection of the ADA to individuals whose 
impairments are episodic in nature is likely to be particularly 
beneficially to mentally disabled individuals, since mental illness is 
often episodic.145 Prior to passage of the ADAAA, the episodic nature 
of mental illness meant that mentally ill individuals in remission 
 
138. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Colonial Intermediate Unit 20, 2013 WL 1234813 
(E.D. Pa.) (holding that plaintiff did not demonstrate that mental 
impairment in its unmitigated state substantially limited a major life 
activity). 
139. 42 U.S.C. §12102(4)(D). 
140. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2012). 
141. See, e.g., Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th 
Cir. 1999) (holding that an “intermittent impairment” disability is 
entitled to protection of ADA and must be reasonably accommodated). 
See also Concannon, supra note 19, at 103-04.  
142. See, e.g., Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Tr., 507 F.3d 
1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that plaintiff with cancer did not 
meet statutory definition of disabled because of episodic nature of 
disease). See also Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 453-54 
(S.D. Tex. 1999) (finding plaintiff with epilepsy not disabled because of 
episodic nature of disease). 
143. Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482-83 (1999) (noting that 
the Court was not specifically considering the issue of episodic 
impairments). See also Concannon, supra note 19, at 104. 
144. Befort, supra, note 1 at 259-60. 
145. See Stefan, supra note 58, at 281–82. 
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might not be protected by the ADA.146  However, in post-ADAAA 
cases, courts have extended the statute’s protection to cover mentally 
ill individuals whose diseases are episodic.147 In listing examples of 
impairments that are episodic in nature, it is noteworthy that the 
EEOC Guidelines specifically list a number of mental disorders 
including major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia 
and post-traumatic stress disorder.148  
D. Defining “Substantially Limits” and “Major Life Activity” 
The ADAAA leaves in place the terms “substantially limits” and 
“major life activity” but clarifies that these terms should be 
interpreted more broadly.149  The purpose section of the ADAAA 
specifically rejects that Supreme Court’s decision in Toyota that the 
terms “‘substantially’ and ‘major’ in the definition of disability should 
be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying 
as ‘disabled.’”150  The purpose section further rejects Toyota’s 
standard that to be “substantially limited in performing a major life 
activity under the ADA ‘an individual must have an impairment that 
prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing activities that 
are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.’”151 While the 
statute rejects Toyota’s interpretation of “substantially limits,” it is 
noteworthy that it fails to provide a new definition for that term.152  
The ADAAA does more specifically define “major life activity” by 
including an illustrative list of “major life activities”153 and specifying 
 
146. See, e.g., Soileau v. Gulford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997) 
(noting that an employee with dysthymia, a chronic depressive disorder 
characterized by intermittent bouts of depression, was not disabled 
under the terms of the ADA because of the episodic nature of the 
disease). 
147. See, e.g., Estate of Murray v. UHS of Fairmount, Inc., No. 10-2561, 
2011 WL 5449364, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2011) (finding that an 
employee whose depression was episodic was disabled under the 
ADAAA, since her disease, when active, substantially limited her ability 
to think, eat, and sleep); see also Kinney v. Century Servs. Corp. II, No. 
10-787, 2011 WL 3476569, at *8 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 9, 2011) (finding that 
an employee was disabled under the ADAAA despite episodic nature of 
her depression). 
148. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(vii) (2012). 
149. Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008, 85 IND. L.J. 187, 201-02 (2010).   
150. ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008); Concannon, supra note 19, 
at 102-03.    
151. ADAAA § 2(b)(4), 42 U.S.C. 12101 (2008). 
152. Webber, supra note 103, at 322. 
153. 42 § U.S.C. 12102(2)(A) (stating that major life activities “include, but 
are not limited to caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
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that major life activities include the operation of major bodily 
function.154 The 2011 EEOC Guidelines both paraphrase and give 
further examples of what constitutes a substantial limitation and a 
major life activity.155 
While the majority of courts in pre-ADAAA cases strictly 
construed the term “major life activity,”156 there was also a lack of 
consensus regarding the definition of this term. 157  Courts struggled 
with the question of when limitations typically associated with mental 
illness constituted a substantial limitation on a major life activity,158 
and were often unsympathetic to mentally ill employees in these 
cases.159 For example, pre-ADAAA cases questioned whether 
interacting and getting along with others,160 or concentrating were 
 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating 
and working”); see also Jeffrey Douglas Jones, Enfeebling the ADA: The 
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 62 OKLA. L. REV. 667, 675 (2010). 
154. 42 § U.S.C. 12102(2)(B) (“[A] major life activity also includes the 
operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited to, 
functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, 
bladder, neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and 
reproductive functions.”). 
155. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h-j) (2011). 
156. Stefan, supra note 58, at 311 (discussing how “severe, chronic illnesses, 
including cancer, are not disabilities under the ADA because they do 
not constitute substantial limitations on major life activities”). 
157. Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of Immutability in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 52 WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1491 (2011) 
(discussing the lack of clarity in pre-ADAAA jurisprudence regarding 
when a disability substantially limits a major life activity); Korn, supra 
note 38, at 640 (discussing the difficulty courts have in determining 
what constitutes a major life activity); Concannon, supra note 19, at 94 
(discussing the meaning of “substantially limits” and “major life 
activity”). 
158. Korn, supra note 38, at 640-41.   
159. See id. at 598-99, 640-41; Parikh, supra note 51, at 749-50 and n. 181.  
Additionally, the pre-ADAAA EEOC Interpretive Guidelines focused on 
activities that are typically associated with physical illness and not on 
activities that are typically associated with mental illness. See, e.g., 
Korn, supra note 38, at 598; and Stefan, supra note 58, at 282-83.  
160. See Deidre M. Smith, The Paradox of Personality: Mental Illness, 
Employment Discrimination, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 79 (2006) (discussing the problems 
with differentiating between mental illness and disfavored personality); 
See generally Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting with Others: A Major Life 
Activity Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 
1139 (2002) (arguing that interacting with others should constitute a 
major life activity). See generally Mark DeLoach, Note, Can’t We All 
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major life activities.161  Courts were also generally unsympathetic to 
mentally ill employees who claimed that they were substantially 
limited in the major life activity of working.162 Additional cases held 
that an employee who suffered from a panic disorder was not 
substantially limited in the major life activity of everyday mobility163 
and a depressed employee with a sleep disturbance was not 
substantially limited in a major life activity.164   
Under the ADAAA’s more expansive definitions of “substantially 
limits” and “major life activity,” impairments associated with mental 
illness are now more likely to be considered disabilities.  The 
ADAAA’s illustrative list of major life activities includes 
“concentrating, thinking, communicating and working”165 which are 
activities commonly associated with mental illness. Further, the 
statute’s list of major bodily functions includes neurological and brain 
 
Just Get Along?: The Treatment of “Interacting with Others” as a 
Major Life Activity in the Americans with Disabilities, 57 VAND. L. REV. 
1313, 1331-35 (2004) (discussing the difficulty plaintiffs face in cases 
where they claim a substantial limitation in the ability to get along with 
others). See also, e.g., Soileau v. Gulford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 15 
(1st Cir. 1997) (holding that the ability to get along with others is not a 
major life activity). Davis v. Univ. of N.C., 263 F.3d 95, 101-02 (4th 
Cir. 2001) (expressing in footnote 4 doubt as to whether the ability to 
get along with others was a major life activity). But see Jacques v. 
DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (determining 
that getting along with others is a major life activity). 
161. See, e.g., Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999) 
cert. denied, 528 U.S. 811 (1999) (holding that concentrating is not a 
major life activity); Korn, supra note 38, at 599 n. 95. 
162. See, e.g., Jerina v. Richardson Auto., Inc., 960 F. Supp 106, 108-09 
(N.D.Tex. 1997) (explaining that plaintiff who suffered from a number 
of mental disorders including depression and panic disorder was not 
substantially limited in his ability to work); Johnson v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 
1997 WL 580708 at *7 (S.D.NY. 1997) (describing an employee who was 
hospitalized for depression was not substantially limited in her ability to 
work). Prior to passage of the ADAAA the Supreme Court expressed 
skepticism as to whether work could be a major life activity, and stated 
that a plaintiff would need to be substantially limited in a broad class of 
jobs and not simply the particular job he or she applied for or currently 
held. See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 119 S.Ct. 2139, 2148 (1999). 
163. See Reeves v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 140 F.3d 144, 149 
-51 (2d Cir. 1998). For a discussion of this case see Parikh, supra note 
51, at 746-47. 
164. Smoke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 98-1370, 200 WL 192806 at *2 
(10th Cir. Feb. 17, 2000). 
165. 42 § U.S.C. 12102(2)(A). 
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function.166  The 2011 EEOC Guidelines further clarify that the term 
mental impairment should be interpreted broadly.167  Post-ADAAA 
cases have generally found that mentally ill employees have at least 
raised a genuine issue of material fact as whether they are 
substantially limited in a major life activity.168 
E. “Regarded As” Prong 
The ADAAA also broadened coverage under the ADA’s “regarded 
as” prong.169  Prior to passage of the ADAAA, a plaintiff could only 
meet the “regarded as” standard if he could show that his employer 
 
166. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B). The EEOC Guidelines specifically list “major 
depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic disorder, obsessive-
compulsive disorder and schizophrenia” as examples of disorders that 
would substantially limit brain function. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(iii) 
(2012). 
167. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(2) (2012) (stating that a mental impairment 
means “[a]ny mental or psychological disorder, such as an intellectual 
disability (formerly termed ‘mental retardation’), organic brain 
syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning 
disabilities.”). 
168. See, e.g., Glaser v. Gap, 994 F. Supp.2d 569, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y 2014) 
(determining that employee raised a genuine issue of material fact as to 
whether autism substantially limited a major life activity); Santee v. 
Lehigh Valley Health Network Inc., 2013 WL 6697865 at *4–5 (E.D. Pa. 
Dec. 19, 2013) (holding that plaintiff who suffered from depression was 
disabled because of her substantial limitation in the major life activity 
of concentrating); Bracken v. DASKO Home Med. Equip., Inc., No. 
1:12–CV–892, 2014 WL 4388261 at *9-10 (S.D. Ohio, Sep. 5, 2014) 
(determining that plaintiff who suffered from depression, anxiety and 
possible bipolar disorder was substantially limited in the major life 
activities of sleeping and eating); Beair v. Summit Polymers, No. 5:11-
420-KKC, 2013 WL 4099196 (E.D. Ky., Aug. 13, 2013) (determining 
that plaintiff with major depressive disorder and PTSD had substantial 
limitations in brain function); Naber v. Dover Healthcare Associates, 
Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d 622, 646 (D. Del. 2011) (holding that depression 
substantially limited the major life activity of sleeping); Holland v. 
Shinseki, No. 3:10-CV-0908-B, 2012 WL 162333, at 6 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
18, 2012) (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether employee 
whose suffered from a number of mental disorders including depression, 
anxiety and acute stress and was unable to sleep more than an hour a 
night was substantially limited in a major life activity). But see 
Blackard v. Livingston Parish Sewer District, No. 12-704-SDD-RLB, 
2014 WL 199629  (M.D. La., Jan. 15, 2014) (holding that plaintiff who 
suffered from bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety and ADHD did not 
demonstrate that she was substantially limited in a major life activity). 
169. See Hoffman, supra note 157, at 1496 (“The revised ‘regarded as’ prong 
of the disability definition is likely to be the most transformative 
improvement for ADA plaintiffs.”). For a general discussion of the 
ADAAA’s broad coverage under the regarded as prong see Diller, supra 
note 13, at 223-27. 
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believed that he had an impairment that substantially limited a major 
life activity.170  In other words, it was not enough for an employee to 
show that his employer viewed him as impaired but rather the 
employee had to prove that the employer specifically believed that the 
impairment substantially limited a major life activity.  Employees 
were therefore required to “get inside the head” of the employer and 
prove the employer’s motivation.171 Additionally, employees were not 
protected in cases of “pure” discrimination or animus-based 
discrimination where the employer’s actions were taken “out of deep 
antipathy for the diagnosed condition rather than any mistaken 
perception of its effects on an individual’s ability to work.”172  In other 
words, it was OK for an employer to fire an employee with bipolar 
disorder because he did not like people with bipolar disorder.  Both 
physically and mentally disabled plaintiffs fared poorly under the 
“regarded as” prong in pre-ADAAA cases.173  
The ADAAA significantly expands the “regarded as” prong of the 
definition of disabled.174  Under the ADAAA, an individual is regarded 
as disabled “if the individual established that he or she has been 
subjected to an action prohibited under this Act because of an actual 
or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the 
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.”175  
Employees therefore no longer need to show that their employer 
viewed them as functionally limited in performing a major life 
activity.176  The legislative history further clarifies that Congress 
 
170. Concannon, supra note 19, at 104. 
171. Id. at 95. 
172. Stefan, supra note 58, at 298–99.   
173. For example, in pre-ADAAA cases employees with cosmetic 
disfigurement were often denied protection under the ADA since they 
were not substantially limited in a major life activity, while in post-
ADAAA cases they would generally be regarded as disabled. Hoffman, 
supra note 157, at 1496–97. Similarly, in pre-ADAAA cases, a number of 
courts held that employees who suffered from anxiety and depression 
were not “regarded as” disabled since they were unable to show that 
their employer believed they were substantially limited in a major life 
activity. See, e.g., Parikh, supra note 51, at 753-56; Concannon, supra 
note 19, at 112; Stefan, supra note 58, at 276; Schwartz v. Comex, No. 
96 CIV. 3386 LAP, 1997 WL 187353, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 1997). 
174. Carol J. Miller, EEOC Reinforces Broad Interpretation of ADAAA 
Disability Qualification: But What Does “Substantially Limit” Mean?, 
76 MO. L. REV. 43, 68 (2011). 
175. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3) (stating that evidence 
that an employer believed the individual was limited in any major life 
activity is not required). 
176. See Befort, supra note 1, at 2044. See also 154 CONG. REC. S8342-46 
(daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) (Explaining that the “regarded as” prong “will 
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intended for the ADAAA to cover animus based types of 
discrimination.177  Congress did include two important statutory 
limitations as a compromise for this broad coverage.178  First, the 
“regarded as” prong “does not apply to impairments that are 
transitory and minor.”179  Second, employers do not need to 
reasonably accommodate employees who are regarded as disabled, but 
only need to accommodate employees who have an actual impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity.180 
The expectation was that the expanded “regarded as” prong 
would lead to a “greater prevalence of prong three claims following 
the effective date of the ADAAA.”181  However, according to one 
study, this has not occurred and the author of the study hypothesized 
two possible reasons for this surprising finding.182  First, it is possible 
that employers are not challenging plaintiff’s coverage under this 
prong since it is unlikely the challenge will be successful. Another 
possibility is that plaintiffs who need an accommodation do not assert 
coverage under the “regarded as” prong since employers are not 
required to reasonably accommodate an employee under this prong.  
While there may not be a greater prevalence of claims under the 
“regarded as” prong, courts that have addressed this prong have 
applied it in a relatively clear and consistent manner.183  The 
expanded prong is likely to have a positive impact on mentally ill 
employees due to the pervasiveness of negative stereotypes and 
stigmas commonly associated with mental illness.184  Mentally ill  
apply to impairments, not only to disabilities. As such, it does not 
require a functional test to determine whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity.”). 
177. Stefan, supra note 58, at 304–06; Diller, supra note 13, at 272-75. 
178. Befort, supra note 1, at 2044. 
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B) (Under the terms of the Act a “transitory 
impairment” is “an impairment with an actual or expected duration of 6 
months or less.”). 
180. 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h).  This statutory limitation makes sense since 
employees who are regarded as disabled – but do not actually have a 
disability – are unlikely to need an accommodation.   
181. See Befort, supra note 1, at 2052. This study examined summary 
judgment decisions addressing whether the employee was “disabled” as 
well as whether the employee was “qualified for the job” over a 40 
month period from January 1, 2010 to April 30, 2013.  
182. Id. at 2063-64. 
183. As one scholar explained, “[P]erhaps because the revision replaced a 
thorny and complicated determination with a more straightforward one, 
the courts seem to have absorbed and applied it rather smoothly.” 
Burgdorf, supra note 110, at 78. 
184. See infra Part III.B. 
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plaintiffs are now able to at least raise a genuine issue of material fact 
as to whether they were “regarded as” disabled by their employer in 
many of these cases.185 However, employees still must show 
“causation” or that they were subjected to an adverse action “because 
of” the perceived impairment,186 and in some cases mentally ill 
plaintiffs have been unable to meet this burden.187  
As this Part has explained, the ADAAA both generally states 
that the term disability should be broadly construed and also 
specifically expands and clarifies the term.  As a result, this expanded 
definition of disability has increased the likelihood that mentally ill 
employees will have standing under the ADA.  However, there are a 
number of remaining hurdles that disabled employees—and 
particularly mentally ill employees—still face under the statute that 
will be discussed in the next Part.    
V. Limitations of the ADAAA 
As explained in the previous Part, the ADAAA’s broadened 
definition of disability has expanded coverage for employees with 
impairments, including mentally ill employees. In post-ADAAA 
decisions, courts are granting significantly fewer summary judgment 
rulings to employers based on disability status alone.188  As a result, 
 
185. See, e.g., Becker v. Elmwood Local School District, 2012 WL 13569, at 
*10 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2012) (holding that there was a factual dispute 
as to whether the employer perceived an employee with OCD as 
disabled); Bracken v. DASKO Home Med. Equip., Inc., No. 1:12–CV–
892, 2014 WL 4388261 at *12 (S.D. Ohio, Sep. 5, 2014) (holding that 
there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether employer 
regarded employee as disabled since employer was aware of employee’s 
mental impairment and  symptoms of impairment); McCracken v. 
Carlton College, 969 F. Supp. 2d 1118, 1130 (D. Minn. 2013) (holding 
that employee who suffered from anxiety and depression met the 
“minimal burden of establishing that he was regarded as disabled”); 
Nelson v. City of New York, 2013 No. 11 Civ. 2732(JPO), WL 4437224  
at *6 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that employee who suffered from depression 
and anxiety raised an issue of fact as to her employer regarding her as 
disabled); Stranzl v. Delaware County, No. 13-1393, 2014 WL 3418996, 
at *7 (E.D.Pa.) (holding that employer regarded employee with anxiety 
attacks, panic attacks and depression as disabled). But see McNally v. 
Aztar Indiana Gaming Co., LLC, No. 3:12-CV-00063-TWP, 2014 WL 
300433, at 3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 28, 2014)  (determining that even though 
employer suggested counseling for employee’s personal problems, this 
did not show that employer regarded him as having a mental disability). 
186. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(3)(ii). 
187. Banaszack v. Ten Sixteen Recovery Network, No. 12-12433, 2013 WL 
2623882, at *6 (E.D. Mich. 2013) (holding that mentally ill employee 
failed to demonstrate that her perceived impairment was a “but-for 
cause” of why she was fired). 
188. Befort, supra note 1, at 2031-32. 
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courts are now grappling with the question of whether these disabled 
employees were discriminated against in the workplace.  As explained 
in Part II, in order to establish a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination under Title I of the ADA a plaintiff must show that he 
is “(1) a disabled person as defined by the ADA; (2) is qualified, with 
or without a reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential 
functions of the job held or desired; and (3) suffered discrimination by 
an employer or prospective employer because of that disability.”189  
Since courts are less likely to grant summary judgment to the 
employer on the issue of disability status alone, more courts are 
addressing the second and third prongs of the prima facie case.  This 
Part will examine some of the hurdles employees face under the 
second and third prong. 
 
 
A.  Formal Equality and the Courts’ General Discomfort with 
Accommodation 
Accommodation requirements under the ADA should be examined 
within the general framework of antidiscrimination law in the United 
States. While a full discussion of the theories of equality is beyond the 
scope of this paper, it is important to understand that “formal 
equality” is the underlying principle of antidiscrimination law in the 
United States.190  As one commentator explained, “The canonical idea 
of ‘antidiscrimination’ in the United States condemns the differential 
treatment of similarly situated individuals” on the basis of protected 
categories.191  Under both the United States Constitution and Title 
VII of the 1964 Civil Right Act, the guiding principle of 
antidiscrimination law is that “like individuals” should be treated in a 
similar manner.  Courts tend to generally view employment 
discrimination statutes as requiring little more than formal equality or 
neutrality and are hesitant to require what they consider to be 
 
189. E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012). 
190. For a general discussion of theories of equality see Bradley A. Areheart, 
The Anticlassification Turn in Employment Discrimination Law, 63 
ALA, L. REV. 955, 962 (2012) (arguing that employment discrimination 
statutes have recently focused more strongly on anticlassification 
principles); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 642, 645 (2001) (discussing how “antidiscrimination and 
accommodation are overlapping rather than fundamentally distinct 
categories, despite the frequent claims of commentators to the 
contrary”); Martha Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits 
of an Antidiscrimination Approach to Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 
1724-25 (2012) (comparing the legal culture of equality in the United 
States with the legal culture of equality in other constitutional 
democracies). 
191. Jolls, supra note 190, at 643. 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:   
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection? 
236 
differential or preferential treatment of employees.192 There are 
exceptions where statutes193 or court decisions194 mandate 
accommodation or “differential” treatment of individuals. However, 
courts are generally more comfortable prohibiting discrimination than 
they are in mandating accommodation and as a result employees tend 
to fare poorly in accommodation cases.195 
The statute addressing “differential” treatment that is most 
similar to the ADA is §701(j) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act which mandates religious accommodation in the workplace. Under 
§701(j), an employer must “reasonably accommodate an employee’s or 
prospective employee’s religious observance or practice” if 
accommodation can be done without “undue hardship.”  Decisions 
interpreting §701(j) illustrate the courts’ general discomfort with 
accommodation.196 While religion is defined broadly under §701(j), the 
United States Supreme Court has twice addressed the scope of §701(j) 
and has both times narrowly defined an employer’s obligation to 
accommodate a religious employee.197 In narrowly interpreting §701(j), 
the Court specifically defined undue hardship as any cost greater than 
“de minimis.”198 When Congress enacted the ADA, it explicitly 
rejected 701(j)’s “de minimis” standard, determining instead that 
“undue hardship” is an “action requiring significant difficulty or 
 
192. Karen Engle, The Persistence of Neutrality: The Failure of the Religious 
Accommodation Provision to Redeem Title VII, 76 TEX. L. REV. 317, 
320 (1997) (“Title VII’s prohibition of discrimination has generally been 
read as requiring that employers apply workplace requirements and 
regulations ‘neutrally.’”). 
193. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) (29 
U.S.C. §§2612) mandates unpaid medical and family leave in certain 
circumstances and §701(j) of Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 
U.S.C. § 2000(e)(j)) requires that employers “reasonably accommodate” 
an employee’s religious observance when such accommodation can be 
done without “undue hardship.” 
194. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 343-44 (2003) (upholding 
an affirmative action policy and holding that public universities could 
consider race as a factor in admissions) (distinguishing that this was an 
equal protection case and not an employment discrimination case). 
195. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1819-20 (2005) (explaining 
that courts dislike accommodation since they view it as an “unwelcome 
species of affirmative action”). 
196. See generally Jamie Darin Prenkert & Julie Manning Magid, A Hobson’s 
Choice Model for Religious Accommodation, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 467, 473-
86 (2006); Kaminer, supra note 16, at 578-79; Engel, supra note 192.   
197. See TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, at 73-74, 79-81 (1977); Ansonia 
Bd. Of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 69 (1986). 
198. TWA, Inc., 432 U.S. at 84. 
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expense.”199 However, as will be explained in the next subpart, courts 
have nonetheless failed to require significant accommodation of 
employees in ADAAA cases.    
In addition to being uncomfortable with accommodation 
generally, courts explicitly distinguish between mutable and 
immutable traits in the workplace and generally do not mandate 
accommodation of mutable traits.200  Employees therefore fare 
particularly poorly in cases where courts consider the characteristic at 
issue to simply be a matter of personal choice. For example, plaintiffs 
regularly lose in cases where an employer’s dress or grooming 
requirements are challenged under Title VII’s prohibition on sex201 or 
race202 discrimination.  Courts have also held that “English only” rules 
are not national origin discrimination since employees can choose 
what language to speak.203  Commentators have criticized the 
mutable/immutable distinction opining not only that some mutable 
traits should be protected but additionally that some traits that 
courts have determined are mutable are in fact immutable.204 Yet 
 
199. H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 68 (1990) (“The Committee wishes to 
make it clear that the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
TWA v. Hardison, U.S. 63 (1977) are not applicable to this legislation. 
In Hardison, the Supreme Court concluded that under Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 an employer need not accommodate persons 
with religious beliefs if the accommodation would require more than a de 
minimis cost for the employer. By contrast, under the ADA, reasonable 
accommodations must be provided unless they rise to the level of 
‘requiring significant difficulty or expense’ on the part of the employer, 
in light of the factors noted in the statute—i.e., a significantly higher 
standard than that articulated in Hardison.”). 
200. See generally Hoffman, supra note 157; Engel, supra note 192, at 408; 
Roberto Gonzalez, Cultural Rights and the Immutability Requirement in 
Disparate Impact Doctrine, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2195, 2199 (2003); Debbie 
N. Kaminer, Religious Conduct and the Immutability Requirement:  
Title VII’s Failure to Protect Religious Employees in the Workplace, 17 
VA. J. OF SOC. POL’Y & L. 453, 454 (2010). 
201. See generally Katherine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes:  Dress 
and Appearance Standards, Community Norms and Workplace Equality, 
92 MICH. L. REV. 2451, n. 196 (1994); Engle, supra note 192, at 340-53. 
202. See Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229, 231-32 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981). 
203. See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980). 
204. See Mark R. Bandsuch, Dressing Up Title VII’s Analysis of Workplace 
Appearance Policies, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 287 (2009) 
(criticizing courts for their overemphasis on the immutability standard); 
Tristan K. Green, Discomfort at Work:  Workplace Assimilation 
Demands and the Contract Hypothesis, 86 N.C. L. REV. 379 (2008) 
(discussing how the debate on workplace equality should be reframed to 
include the goal of social equality); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
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despite these critiques, courts tend to regularly hold that immutable 
traits are not entitled to accommodation.205 
Requests for accommodation under the ADAAA must be 
examined within this general framework of antidiscrimination law in 
the United States. First, courts are generally unsympathetic to an 
employee’s requests for “differential treatment” or accommodation, 
and this is a hurdle that will be faced by employees who request 
accommodation under the ADAAA.206   Second, one of the stereotypes 
involving mental illness is that it is not a real disease but rather a 
somewhat mutable characteristic.207  Mentally ill individuals are often 
stigmatized as choosing to behave in an undesirable manner.  
Additionally, there is the stereotype that mentally ill individuals are 
simply malingerers, actively choosing to deceive others.208  Finally, the 
definition of what constitutes a mental illness is somewhat illusive and 
continually in flux, which further contributes to the view that mental 
illness is mutable.209  According to this line of reasoning, it is not only 
patients who could “choose” to behave in a more desirable manner, 
but also the doctors who get to “choose” how to define mental 
illness.210   
B.  When is a Mentally Ill Individual “Qualified?” 
This Part will discuss both the definition of “qualified” and the 
specific application of “qualified” status to mentally ill employees.  
Under the ADA both physically and mentally ill employees must be 
“qualified” for the job in question.  However, mentally ill employees 
face unique hurdles in proving “qualified” status and are more likely 
than physically ill employees to have their ADA claim fail because 
they are not deemed “qualified.”  
1. Definition of Qualified Individual 
In post-ADAAA cases, courts are significantly more likely to find 
that an employee meets the statutory definition of disabled and 
therefore more likely to address the second prong of the prima facie 
case, which is whether the employee “is qualified, with or without a 
 
Employment Discrimination:  A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. 
REV. 458, 462-63 (2001) (proposing a structural approach to the 
problem of second generation employment discrimination).   
205. See supra note 198. 
206. See Waterstone, supra note 195, at 1819-20 (explaining that courts 
dislike accommodation since they view it as an “unwelcome species of 
affirmative action”). 
207. See infra Part III.C.1. 
208. Id. 
209. See infra Part III.A. 
210. Id. 
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reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the 
job.”211  One recent study found that “district court summary 
judgment rulings based on qualified status as compared to all district 
court summary judgment rulings” went from 28% in pre-ADAAA 
cases to 47% in post-ADAAA cases.212  In addition to more courts 
reaching the issue of qualified status, courts are also more likely to 
find that employees are unqualified in the post-ADAAA cases.213 
While summary judgment was granted to the employer in 47.9% of 
cases that ruled on the qualified issue in pre-ADAAA cases, this 
number increased to a 69.7% employer win rate in post-ADAAA cases 
that ruled on the qualified issue.214  Therefore, while plaintiffs are now 
more likely to have “disability” standing, they are also more likely to 
lose at the summary judgment stage based on “qualified status.”  As 
the author of the study opined, as a result of the shift in focus to 
“qualified” status, “the more plaintiff-friendly outcomes engineered by 
the ADAAA with respect to disability status are being partially offset 
by more employer-friendly outcomes with respect to qualified 
status.”215 
In defining essential functions, the ADA specifically states that 
“consideration shall be given to the employer’s judgment as to what 
functions of the job are essential,”216 and courts tend to give deference 
to an employer’s determination.217 The EEOC regulations both 
reiterate that the term does not include “marginal” functions of the 
job and also provide a non-exclusive list of factors employers should 
consider in determining if a function is essential.218  However, it is 
somewhat unclear when something rises to the level of being an 
“essential function.”  For example, while many courts have held that 
regular attendance is always an essential job function, some have 
taken a more fact specific approach.219   
Closely related to the definition of the term “essential functions” 
 
211. E.E.O.C. v. Picture People, Inc., 684 F.3d 981, 985 (10th Cir. 2012). 
212. Befort, supra note 1, at 2054-55. 
213. Id. at 2025. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 2071. 
216. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 § U.S.C. 12111(8) (2012). 
217. Ward v. Mass. Health Research Inst. Inc., 209 F.3d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 
2000); Mason v. Avaya Commc’ns Inc., 357 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 
2004); Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 147 (1st Cir. 2006). 
218. 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(n)(3). 
219. Concannon, supra note 19, at 97. 
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is the definition of the term “reasonable accommodation,”220 and as 
explained in the previous subpart, courts tend to be uncomfortable 
with preferences or statutory mandates of accommodation. Under the 
ADA, an employer must make “reasonable accommodations to the 
known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless 
such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”221  The 
ADA does not define “reasonable accommodation,” but instead gives 
examples of possible accommodations which include “job 
restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a 
vacant position [and] acquisition or modification of equipment or 
devices.”222  Undue hardship is defined as “an action requiring 
significant difficulty or expense.”223  The EEOC regulations provide 
further examples of possible accommodations as well as when 
accommodations would constitute an undue hardship.224 
The reasonable accommodation provision of the ADA has not 
been interpreted by the courts in a clear and consistent manner.225 
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, the only Supreme Court case that has 
interpreted this provision, held that an accommodation that violates a 
seniority system would generally not be considered reasonable.226  
 
220. See generally Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 57 (2013) (discussing 
how the framework used by the Supreme Court in PGA Tour Inc. v. 
Martin can be used to develop a coherent framework for deciding Title I 
ADA cases); Mark C. Weber, Unreasonable Accommodation and Due 
Hardship, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1119, 1133 (2010) (discussing how reasonable 
accommodation and undue hardship are “two sides of the same coin”); 
see Carlos A. Ball, Preferential Treatment and Reasonable 
Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 55 ALA. L. 
REV. 951, 974 (2004).   
221. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C § 12112(b)(5)(A) 
(2012). 
222. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2012). 
223. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A) 
(2012). 
224. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)-(p).  For a detailed discussion of the legislative 
history and EEOC interpretation of the terms “reasonable 
accommodation” and “undue hardship” see Weber, supra note 220, at 
1131-42. 
225. One commentator referred to it as “the chaos of the interpretation of 
the reasonable accommodation provision.” See Porter, supra note 220, at 
543. 
226. U.S Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 406 (2002). The Court did 
state that under “special circumstances” an accommodation that 
violates a seniority system might be reasonable. Id. 
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Most lower courts have found that employers do not need to create 
positions for disabled employees, provide accommodations of a 
personal nature such as medications or hearing aids, or monitor an 
employee’s health needs.227  However, it is unclear whether other 
accommodations would be unreasonable.228  For example, the lower 
courts are split on the questions of whether an employer needs to 
provide an employee with work-related transportation229 and whether 
an employer must consider an employee’s request to work from 
home.230  Courts are also split on the question of whether an employer 
must reassign an employee to a vacant position if there are other 
more qualified employees available for the position,231 and whether 
accommodations that burden other employees should be required.232   
Courts have not consistently required a high level of accommodation 
of disabled employees. 
2. Application of “Qualified” Status to Mentally Ill Employees 
The shift in focus from “disability status” to “qualified status” is 
likely to have a larger impact on mentally disabled employees than on 
physically disabled employees.  As previously explained, one study 
found that both physically and mentally disabled plaintiffs in pre-
ADAAA cases had a similar level of difficulty establishing class 
 
227. See Porter, supra note 220, at 546–47 (citing cases). 
228. For a discussion of lower court cases interpreting the accommodation 
provision of the ADA see id. at 543–58; Weber, supra note 220, at 1152-
60. 
229. Compare Wade v. Gen. Motors Corp., 165 F.3d 29, at 2 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(employer is not obligated to provide accommodation so that employee 
is able to work night shifts), with Lyons v. Legal Aid Society, 68 F.3d 
1512, 1517 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that an employer could be obligated 
to accommodate an employee with difficulty getting to work). 
230. Compare Mobley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 531 F.3d 539, 547-48 (7th Cir. 
2008) (holding that working at home is generally not a reasonable 
accommodation), with Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 
F.2d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (analyzing whether it would be 
possible for disabled employee to work at home since her OCD only 
made it difficult for her to leave the house and did not affect her ability 
to do her work). 
231. Compare Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1154 (10th Cir. 
1999) (disabled employee should be transferred to a vacant position 
even if more qualified employees apply), with Huber v. Walmart Stores, 
Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part, 552 U.S. 
1074 (2007), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1136 (2008) (employer did not 
need to transfer employee to vacant position if more qualified employees 
applied for the position). See also Porter, supra, note 220, at 540-41. 
232. Id. at 552 (citing cases). 
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membership.233 However, individuals with mental impairments were 
more likely to fail because they were not deemed “qualified” while 
individuals with physical disabilities were more likely to fail because 
they were not deemed “disabled.”234  A second study involving a 
different set of cases also found that mentally impaired individuals 
fared worse than physically impaired individuals in pre-ADAAA cases 
based on qualified status.235  This study found that in post-ADAAA 
cases physically and mentally ill employees fare equally poorly, but 
the author cautioned that it involved a much smaller sample of 
cases.236  In other words, the biggest hurdle to mentally ill employees 
had been “qualified status,” and this hurdle remains unchanged.   
In many cases, the question of whether a mentally ill employee is 
qualified hinges on whether the employee is able to perform the job 
with a reasonable accommodation. A preliminary issue with 
reasonable accommodation is that the employer must be aware of the 
employee’s disability and need for accommodation.  As explained in 
Part III, mentally ill employees are less likely to request an 
accommodation than physically disabled employees either because 
they are unaware that they are ill or because they are actively hiding 
their disorder as a result of the stigma associated with mental 
illness.237 
One accommodation issue that has come up in a number of both 
pre-ADAAA and post-ADAAA cases involving mentally ill employees 
is the employees’ difficulty getting along with others.238  This often 
occurs in cases where an employee suffers from depression and 
anxiety.239  A common accommodation requested by employees who 
 
233. Hensel & Jones, supra note 63, at 65-69 (indicating that while plaintiffs 
with mental disabilities were slightly less likely to establish class 
membership than plaintiffs with physical disabilities, the difference was 
not statistically significant). 
234. See supra notes 113-119 and accompanying text. 
235. Befort, supra note 1, at 2056. 
236. Id. 
237. See supra Part III.B. 
238. See supra Part IV.D (explaining how in pre-ADAAA cases, courts 
struggled with whether the ability to get along with others was a major 
life activity and often found that it was not. In post-ADAAA cases these 
employees are more likely to be found to be disabled). 
239. See, e.g., Palmerini v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs. LLC, No. 12-CV-505-
JD, 2014 WL 3401826, at *3 (D.N.H. Jul. 9, 2014) (employee suffered 
from post-traumatic stress disorder, a form of anxiety and depression); 
Beair v. Summit Polymers, No. 5:11-420-KKC, 2013 WL 4099196 (E.D. 
Ky., Aug. 13, 2013) (employee suffered from anxiety and depression); 
Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp.2d 1106, 1109 (D. Minn. 
2011) (employee suffered from depression and general anxiety disorder); 
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have difficulty getting along with others is a transfer away from the 
colleague they are having a conflict with, since psychiatric disabilities 
can be exacerbated by environmental stressors.  Courts tend to be 
very unsympathetic to these requests and routinely hold that 
transferring an employee away form a manager or coworker who is 
causing stress or conflict is not a reasonable accommodation.240  As 
courts have explained, nothing in the ADA gives an employee the 
right to demand a “work environment without aggravation”241 or to 
control who he works with.242   Employees who are having trouble 
getting along with their colleagues or supervisors also sometimes 
request that the employer instruct other employees to modify their 
behavior. Courts routinely hold that it not reasonable for an employee 
to demand that an employer instruct coworkers or managers to 
change their behavior.243  
Employees who suffer from mental illness also commonly request 
a modified work schedule because their current work schedule is 
 
Prichard v. Dominguez, 2006 No. 3:05cv40 WL 1836017 at *13 (N.D. 
Fla. June 29, 2006) (employee suffered from dysthymia, a form of 
depression); Gaul v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 577 (3rd Cir. 
1998) (employee suffered from depression and anxiety related disorders). 
240. See, e.g., Whalen v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:11-CV-0794, 2014 WL 
3529976, slip op. at 7, (N.D.N.Y. Jul. 15, 2014) (holding that it is not a 
reasonable accommodation to guarantee that plaintiff with depression 
and anxiety will never have contact with colleague who triggers these 
conditions); Palmerini, 2014 WL 3401826, at *8 (holding that it is not 
reasonable for an employee to ask for multiple reassignments based on 
his inability to get along with his managers); Beair, 2013 WL 4099196 
(holding that it is not reasonable accommodation to transfer an 
employee to a position so she will be subject to less supervision); 
Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp.2d 1106, 1123 (D. Minn. 
2011) (stating that it is not reasonable for an employee to ask for a 
transfer because of difficulty getting along with other coworkers); 
Prichard v. Dominguez, 2006 WL 1836017 at *13 (N.D.. Fla. June 29, 
2006) (discussing the “overwhelming unanimity of opinions in courts” 
that under the ADA it is unreasonable to request a transfer away from 
an undesirable boss); Gaul, 134 F.3d at 579 (holding that it is 
unreasonable for an employee to ask for a transfer away from coworkers 
and colleagues who cause him stress). 
241. Palmerini, 2014 WL 3401826 at *7.  
242. Prichard, 2006 WL 1836017 at *13.  
243. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. Wiggins, No. 12–CV–1050, 2013 WL 2151537 
(W.D. Ark. May 16, 2013) (holding that it is not a reasonable 
accommodation for employee to request that his boss change his “harsh 
management style” since employee is not entitled to a stress-free 
environment); Schwarzkopf v. Brunswick Corp., 833 F. Supp.2d 1106 
(D. Minn. 2011) (stating that it is unreasonable for a mentally ill 
employee to request that his boss and colleagues be instructed not to 
yell at him). 
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unfeasible as a result of their illness.  This is an issue in both pre-
ADAAA and post-ADAAA cases and may include a request for 
reassignment to another position or permission to work from home.  
The lower courts have generally agreed that employers do not need to 
create positions for disabled employees, and mentally ill employees 
tend to lose in cases where they request a shortened or part-time work 
week and no part-time positions are available.244 Courts have also 
routinely held that regular attendance at work is an essential job 
function and employers are not required to accommodate an 
employee’s inability to consistently arrive at work on time as a result 
of mental illness.245 It is unclear whether an employer needs to 
reassign a mentally ill employee to a vacant position if there are other 
more qualified employees available for the position.246 It is also unclear 
if a court would require an employer to consider a mentally ill 
employee’s request to work at home.247   
Another issue that arises more often with mentally ill employees 
than with physically ill employees is employee misconduct or 
inappropriate behavior since mental illness is more likely than 
physical illness to manifest itself in the form of conduct.248  Courts in 
 
244. See Treanor v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 575 (8th Cir. 
2000) (holding that ADA did not require employer to create a part-time 
position for employee who suffered from depression); Lamb v. Qualex, 
Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 374, 379 (W.D. Va. 1998) (holding that ADA did 
not require employer to create a part-time position for employee 
suffering from depression). 
245. Dorgan v. Suffolk Community College, 2014 WL 3858395 (E.D.N.Y. 
August 4, 2014) (holding that employer does not need to further 
accommodate employee with bipolar disorder who was unable to arrive 
at work on time despite modifications to her schedule); Blackard, 2014 
WL 199619 at 6 (holding that employer did not need to switch an 
employee who suffered from bipolar disorder, depression, anxiety and 
ADHD to the day shift since employee would be unable to consistently 
arrive to work on time even with the accommodation). 
246. Compare Smith v. Midland Brake Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1154 (10th Cir. 
1999) (disabled employee should be transferred to a vacant position 
even if more qualified employees apply), with Huber v. Walmart Stores, 
Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. granted in part, 552 U.S. 
1074 (2007), cert. dismissed, 522 U.S. 1136 (2008) (employer did not 
need to transfer employee to vacant position if more qualified employees 
applied for the position). See also Porter, supra note 220, at 540-41. 
247. See, e.g., Langon v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 959 F.2d 1053, 
1061 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (analyzing whether it would be possible for 
disabled employee to work at home since her OCD only made it difficult 
for her to leave the house but did not affect her ability to do her work). 
248. Karen Dill Danforth, Reading Reasonableness Out of the ADA: 
Responding to Threats by Employees with Mental Illness Following 
Palmer, 85 VA. L. REV. 661, 677-78 (1999). 
Health Matrix·Volume 26·Issue 1·2016  
Mentally Ill Employees in the Workplace:   
Does the ADA Amendments Act Provide Adequate Protection? 
245 
both pre-ADAAA and post-ADAAA cases are generally 
unsympathetic to these employees and routinely hold that employers 
need not accommodate employee misconduct in the workplace even if 
the conduct stems from mental illness.249 In one recent case, an 
employee who suffered from bipolar disorder entered the store where 
he worked after closing hours, disarmed the alarm, locked himself in 
the building, entered the safe, played on computers, and texted the 
Regional Manager about where he was and what he was doing.250  
After he refused to cooperate with an investigation into his behavior, 
he was fired for this conduct by a decision-maker who was unaware he 
suffered from bipolar disorder.  The court held that since the 
employee was fired because of his conduct, the ADA was not 
violated.251  The court emphasized that ignoring or excusing employee 
misconduct—even if caused by an underlying illness—is not a 
reasonable accommodation.252   
However, another recent decision was more sympathetic to an 
autistic employee’s inappropriate behavior.253 The court denied the 
employer’s motion for summary judgment since the employer did not 
demonstrate that the employee violated company policy.  While the 
autistic employee had temporarily blocked an employee in her cubicle, 
he moved when she indicated that she needed to leave the cubicle and 
the court concluded that the behavior “did not have the type of 
sexual undertone that would bring it within the ambit of” the 
company’s sexual harassment policy.254  The court essentially held 
that an autistic employee’s conduct must be viewed based on his 
social limitations.    
Perhaps the most serious type of inappropriate conduct in the 
workplace involves violence or threats of violence. Courts, in both pre-
ADAAA and post-ADAAA cases have consistently held that 
employers do not need to tolerate an employee’s violence or threats of 
violence in the workplace and can terminate employees who violate 
nondiscriminatory workplace policies.255 As the Second Circuit stated, 
 
249. See id. at 679-80 (citing cases); Korn, supra note 38, at 643-46.   
250. Yarberry v. Gregg Appliances, Inc., No. 1:12–cv–611–HJW, 2014 WL 
4639149 at *1 (S.D. Ohio Sep. 16, 2014). 
251. Id. 
252. Id. at *5. 
253. See Glaser v. Gap Inc., 994 F. Supp. 2d 569, 577 (S.D.N.Y 2014) 
(explaining that autism often manifests itself with unusual behavior and 
difficulty communicating and socializing). 
254. Id. at 579. 
255. See, e.g., Snider v. United States Steel-Fairfield Works Med. Dep’t, 25 
F.3d 1361, 1368 (N.D. Ala. 2014); Pabon v. New York City Transit 
Authority, 703 F. Supp. 2d 188, 202 (E.D.N.Y 2010); Glaser v. Sista v. 
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an “employer may discipline or terminate an individual who, because 
of a disability, makes a threat against other employees if the same 
discipline would be imposed on a non-disabled employee engaged in 
the same conduct.”256  Mentally ill employees who engage in such 
conduct are not protected by the ADA, even if their actions are 
caused by the illness.  As the First Circuit explained, “[T]he ADA 
does not require an employee whose unacceptable behavior threatens 
the safety of others to be retained, even if the behavior stems from a 
mental disability.”257  
The fact that courts consistently reach this holding is not 
surprising since courts are generally unsympathetic to employee 
misconduct and workplace violence is a serious concern in the United 
States today.  However, as explained in Part III, mentally ill 
employees are often stigmatized as violent and it is therefore 
important that only those employees who actually threaten or engage 
in violence are found to be “unqualified” and rules really are applied 
in a “legitimate and nondiscriminatory manner.”   Additionally, as 
explained in Part III it is often difficult to predict which employees—
regardless of whether they made threats—will actually engage in 
violent behavior in the workplace. 
Related to and sometimes confused with the concept of employee 
misconduct is the “direct threat” provision of the ADA.  The ADA 
specifically states that employees who pose “a direct threat to the 
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”258 do not meet 
the qualification standards of the ADA. The EEOC Regulations 
define a direct threat as “a significant risk of substantial harm to the 
health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated 
or reduced by reasonable accommodation.”259  While the direct threat 
definition was adopted from a case under the Rehabilitation Act260 
that involved an employee with tuberculosis, the legislative history of 
the ADA makes clear that this defense covers mental illness as well.261 
While there is some case law that confuses the two concepts, the 
direct threat defense is distinct from and not meant to be applied in 
 
CDC IXIS North America, Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 171 (2d Cir. April 13, 
2006); Glaser v. Sista v. CDC IXIS North America, Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 
171 (2d Cir. 2006); Williams v. Motorola Inc., 303 F.3d 1284, 1291 (11th 
Cir. 2002). 
256. Sista, 445 F.3d at 171. 
257. Calef, 322 F.3d at 87. 
258. 42 U.S.C. § 12113b (2009). 
259. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (r). 
260. Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cnty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286 n.14 (1987). 
261. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 485 (1990). 
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cases where an employee engages in threatening behavior.262  Rather, 
the direct threat defense is meant to be applied in cases involving 
“discriminatory application of qualification standards” that “screen 
out” disabled individuals.263  As one Court of Appeals explained, this 
distinction between posing a threat and engaging in threatening 
behavior “maintains the necessary balance between ‘protecting 
disabled individuals from discrimination based on prejudice 
stereotypes or unfounded fear’…and permitting employers to protect 
themselves and their employees and customers from potentially 
violent employees.”264  In “direct threat” cases, courts are required to 
make an individualized assessment of whether the disabled employee 
is “qualified.”265  In enacting the direct threat defense, and 
emphasizing the need for an individualized assessment, legislators had 
expressed concern that employers would discriminate against mentally 
ill employees and assume that they posed a “direct threat” based on 
the negative stereotypes of the mentally ill.266   
For example, in a recent federal district court case involving a 
police officer who suffered from major depression, anxiety and 
personality disorders,  the court denied summary judgment for the 
employer based on the “direct threat” defense since the court could 
not “definitely conclude” that the plaintiff was not qualified. 267   The 
plaintiff had been on disability leave and applied for reinstatement 
which was denied based on her “extensive psychological history” and 
“concerns about compromised stress tolerance.”268  This case involved 
the “direct threat defense” since the plaintiff had not engaged in any 
threatening behavior but rather the employer had determined that 
she did not meet the qualification standards for the job.  It is 
 
262. See Danforth, supra note 248, at 686 (“The Seventh Circuit, in Palmer 
v. Circuit Court, blurred the distinctions between firing an employee 
solely for misconduct that violates a nondiscriminatory workplace policy 
and deeming an employee ‘not otherwise qualified’ when he poses a 
direct threat.”). See also Sista, 445 F.3d at 170-73 (discussing the 
difference between an employee’s threatening behavior and an employee 
constituting a “direct threat”). 
263. Sista, 445 F.3d at 171. 
264. Id. at 172. 
265. Id. 
266. See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 485 (“Decisions are not permitted to be 
based on generalizations about the disability but rather must be based 
on the facts of an individual case. For example, an employer may not 
assume that a person with a mental disability, or a person who has been 
treated for a mental disability, poses a direct threat to others.”). 
267. Nelson, 2013 WL 4437224, at *13 (S.D.N.Y). 
268. Id. at *4. 
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noteworthy that the court did not grant summary judgment to the 
City based on the “direct threat” defense because courts are more 
likely to defer to employers in cases involving public safety.  In fact, 
the court noted that the demands placed on police officers are “unique 
and extreme” and that lapses in judgment could result in “injury or 
death” but nonetheless concluded that the employer failed to meet its 
burden.269   
C. Adverse Action 
In addition to being “disabled” and “qualified,” a claimant must 
also meet the third prong of a prima facie case of discrimination under 
the ADA, and show that he suffered an adverse action because of his 
disability.270 Since claimants are more likely to be found to be 
“disabled” in post-ADAAA cases, courts are now more likely to 
address the question of whether an employee suffered an adverse 
action because of his disability.  Employees face a number of hurdles 
under this third prong of the prima facie case.    
Prior to passage of the ADAAA, employees were often 
unsuccessful in cases that addressed this third prong of the ADA.271  
A number of cases determined that actions taken by the employer did 
not rise to the level of constituting an adverse action.  For example, 
at least two circuit courts held that requiring a mentally disabled 
employee to undergo a psychiatric evaluation was not an adverse 
employment action.272   
A number of post-ADAAA cases have similarly found that the 
complained of incident did not rise to the level of being an adverse 
action.  One recent district court decision found that a number of 
incidents that were alleged by a disabled employee—including being 
transferred to a different office, failing to have her computer files 
transferred, and failing to receive responses to questions regarding 
issues with her pay check—did not alone or in aggregate rise to the 
level of being an adverse action.273 In another recent case, an employee 
who resigned from his position as a teacher—after being told that he 
would receive a “non-renewal recommendation” if he did not resign 
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the same day—was not constructively discharged.274 The teacher 
believed that he had no choice but to resign since having “his contact 
non-renewed…would result in a great inability to get another teacher’s 
job.”275 
One of the biggest hurdles faced by disabled employees is the 
unresolved issue of whether a claimant can bring a “mixed motive” 
claim under the ADA, or if instead a claimant is required to show 
that the adverse action occurred solely or exclusively because of the 
disability.276  Courts that have addressed this issue have relied on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of other civil rights statutes with 
similar language. The Supreme Court has held that under the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) a plaintiff must prove 
that age was the “but for” cause of the challenged adverse 
employment action and not simply that “age was one motivating 
factor.”277  Similarly, in retaliation claims brought under Title VII of 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff 
must prove that the unlawful retaliation “was a ‘but-for’ cause of the 
adverse action, and not simply a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in 
the employer’s decision.”278  The Court reached the conclusion that 
the “but-for” standard was appropriate in both of these cases, based 
in part on the fact that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII and 
ADEA both make it unlawful to discriminate “because” of certain 
criteria.  On the other hand, the “mixed motive” standard applies to 
claims of discrimination brought under Title VII since Title VII 
specifically prohibits discrimination based on protected classes “even 
though other factors also motivated” the discrimination.279  In other 
words, in discrimination claims brought under Title VII, the 
discriminatory action does not need to be based solely or exclusively 
on a protected category.  It has not been fully resolved whether the 
appropriate standard under the ADAAA is the “mixed motive” 
standard of discrimination claims under Title VII or the “but-for” 
standard of both the ADEA and the anti-retaliation provision of Title 
VII. 
The majority of cases tend to hold that the appropriate standard 
under the ADAAA is the stricter “but-for” standard.  In Serwatka v. 
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Rockwell Automation,280 a case that was decided after enactment of 
the ADAAA but applied the pre-ADAAA version of the statute since 
the statute is not retroactive, the Seventh Circuit applied the “but 
for” standard.  The Seventh Circuit explained that “but for” was the 
appropriate standard since the ADA prohibited discrimination 
“because of” a disability and the Supreme Court had interpreted 
similar “because of” language in ADEA as requiring but-for 
causation.281  The court specifically noted that the post-ADAAA 
version of the statute prohibits discrimination “on the basis” of a 
disability and not “because of” a disability and it was unclear whether 
“this or any other revision to the statute matters in terms of the 
viability of a mixed-motive claim under the ADA.”282  However, in a 
later case, the Seventh Circuit found that the “because of” and “on 
the basis of” language had the same meaning.283  Furthermore, district 
courts in the Seventh Circuit have relied on Serwatka in applying the 
stricter but-for standard in post-ADAAA cases.284 Therefore, the “but-
for” standard seems to apply in the Seventh Circuit. 
The Sixth Circuit similarly applied the “but-for” standard in a 
case involving the pre-ADAAA version of the statute.285 In a later 
case, the Sixth Circuit noted that its reasoning was the same under 
either the “because of” or “on the basis of”286 language. District courts 
in the Sixth Circuit, relying on these cases, have applied the “but-for” 
standard in post-ADAAA cases.287 At least one district court in the 
Fifth Circuit also applied the “but for” standard under the 
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ADAAA.288  Similarly, district courts in the Second Circuit stated in 
dicta that “but-for” was likely the appropriate standards in ADAAA 
cases, but ultimately determined that they did not need to resolve the 
issue.289    
While the appropriate causation standard is therefore not fully 
resolved, the majority of courts seem to apply the stricter but-for 
standard, and hold that the “on the basis of” language of the ADAAA 
is similar to the “because of” language of ADEA and the pre-ADAAA 
version of the ADA.  One commentator had opined that the 
appropriate standard is unclear and that courts might apply the more 
lenient “mixed-motive” standard based on the Congressional 
declaration that the ADAAA be interpreted broadly.290  However, this 
author believes that is unlikely since, as previously mentioned, the 
ADAAA’s language is similar to the language in ADEA.  
Furthermore, the ADAAA, unlike the anti-discrimination provision of 
Title VII, does not contain language that mandates the “mixed 
motive” standard.   Courts will therefore in all probability continue to 
resolve the ambiguity in favor of the stricter but-for standard which 
will make it difficult for disabled employees—including mentally ill 
employees—to establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the 
ADAAA. 
One recent district court decision from the Seventh Circuit 
addressed the application of the “but-for” standard in a case involving 
a mentally ill employee.291  The court held that the plaintiff, who 
suffered from bipolar disorder, was not fired as a result of her 
disability because the majority of the management committee that 
ultimately terminated her employment did not know that she had 
bipolar disorder.  As a result, the employee’s disability could not 
possibly have been the “but-for” cause of the termination.292 
Interestingly, the court went out of its way to emphasize that there 
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was no “discriminatory animus.”293 For example, the court found that 
a colleague’s negative comments that the plaintiff had “gone manic” 
or was “too manic” did not show requisite causation and were not 
discriminatory.294  Since the court could have simply resolved the 
causation issue based on the fact that most of the management 
committee did not know she was bipolar, it is interesting that the 
court chose to emphasize that these possibly derogatory references 
were not bias.   
D. Summary of the Second and Third Prongs of a Prima Facie Case of 
Discrimination 
Since employees are more likely to be found to be “disabled” 
under the first prong of the prima-facie case in post-ADAAA cases, 
courts are increasingly grappling with whether the employee faced 
discrimination under the second and third prongs of the prima facie 
case.  Employees do not consistently fare well under the second prong, 
which requires that an employee “is qualified, with or without a 
reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential functions of the 
job.”295 Courts often determine that employers are not required to 
accommodate disabled employees in the workplace.296  One reason for 
this is that “formal equality” is the underlying principle of 
employment discrimination law in the United States, and courts are 
often reluctant to mandate accommodation, or differential treatment, 
of employees. Additionally, courts are particularly reluctant to require 
the types of accommodation that mentally ill employees may need, 
such as a modified work schedule or a transfer away from a colleague 
who exacerbates their illness.297 The stereotype of mentally ill 
individuals as violent may also lead courts to determine that 
accommodation is not required.    
Mentally ill employees also do not consistently fare well under the 
“adverse action” or third prong of the prima facie case.  Some post-
ADAAA cases have determined that the complained of incident does 
not rise to the level of being an adverse action. Additionally, the 
majority of courts have held that a claimant cannot bring a “mixed 
motive” claim under the ADA, but rather must show that their 
disability was the “but-for” cause of discrimination.298  This makes it 
difficult for mentally ill employees to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under the ADAAA. 
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VI. Conclusion 
The ADAAA specifically overturned four Supreme Court decisions 
and broadened the ADA’s definition of disability.  In doing so, the 
ADAAA succeeded in refocusing Title I employment cases away from 
the question of whether an employee is disabled to instead address the 
question of whether the disabled employee suffered discrimination.  
The expanded definition of disability has therefore removed one 
significant hurdle and has greatly increased the likelihood that 
mentally ill employees will have disability standing under the ADA.  
However, this increase has had a larger impact on physically disabled 
employees than on mentally disabled employees. 
Additionally, the ADAAA failed to make other necessary 
statutory amendments and many mentally ill employees continue to 
have difficulty establishing a prima facie case of disability 
discrimination under the ADA.  Employees do not consistently fare 
well under the second prong of the prima facie case of disability 
discrimination with courts often finding that mentally ill employees 
are not qualified and that the employer is not required to 
accommodate them.   Mentally ill employees also do not consistently 
fare well under the adverse action or third prong of the prima facie 
case both because courts may determine that the complained of 
incident does not rise to the level of being an adverse action and 
because the majority of courts have held that a claimant cannot bring 
a “mixed motive” claim under the ADA.   
The ADAAA does not apply retroactively to incidents that 
occurred before 2009, and as a result, the case law is still developing.  
However, based on the current case law, it appears that while the 
ADAAA is a positive step for mentally ill employees, these employees 
still face hurdles in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination 
under the ADA. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
